
Gomes of Lisbon's *Scriptum super Questiones Metaphisice Antonii Andree*. A Renaissance commentary on Antonius Andreae

*El Scriptum super Questiones Metaphisice Antonii Andree de Gómez de Lisboa.
Un comentario renacentista sobre Antoni Andreu*

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Abstract: Gomes of Lisbon (c.1440/50?-1512) was one of the most important representatives of Scotism in the Italian Renaissance. In his *Scriptum super Questiones Metaphisice Antonii Andree*, he sometimes disagrees with Antonius Andreas' solutions and interpretations of Scotus. With this article, I intend to present these points of disagreement. By doing so, I hope to contribute to the understanding of Scotism in the Renaissance and to provide a good example of Antonius Andreas' lasting influence.

Keywords: Gomes of Lisbon, Scotism, Renaissance scholasticism.

Resumen: Gómez de Lisboa (c.1440/50?-1512) fue uno de los más importantes representantes del escotismo del renacimiento italiano. En su *Scriptum super Questiones Metaphisice Antonii Andree*, a veces está en desacuerdo con las soluciones de Antoni Andreu y con sus interpretaciones de Escoto. Con este artículo, trato de presentar esos puntos de desacuerdo. Al hacerlo, espero contribuir a la comprensión del escotismo del renacimiento y proporcionar un buen ejemplo de la duradera influencia de Antoni Andreu.

Palabras clave: Gómez de Lisboa, escotismo, escolasticismo renacentista.

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Undisputedly, Antonius Andreae's works reached a high level of influence within the Scotist tradition, their main virtue being that they accurately portray Scotus's doctrines in a way that is better suited for teaching purposes.

Gomes of Lisbon, a Portuguese Scotist metaphysician and theologian of the Renaissance, produced a commentary on Andreae's questions on the *Metaphysics*. He uses Andreae's text to address the issues of his time and tradition, such as the univocity of being, the formal distinction and the vocabulary of the *formalizantes*, the problem of universals, the possibility of natural knowledge of immaterial substances, and the relation between experience and knowledge. Although he often follows Andreae's interpretations of Scotus, there are five occasions where that is not the case.

In this article, I intend to explore the reasons behind these points of disagreement. To do so, I will first do a brief introduction to Gomes of Lisbon, his context, and his *Scriptum super Questiones Metaphysice Antonii Andree*. Secondly, I will dedicate a section to each point of disagreement between Gomes and Andreae.

I aim to contribute to the knowledge of the history of Antonius Andreae's influence within the Scotist tradition. I also intend to draw attention to the figure of Gomes of Lisbon, whose works are not yet well known by scholars interested in Scotism and in Late Scholasticism in general.

1. THE CONTEXT OF THE *SCRIPTUM SUPER QUESTIONES METAPHYSICE ANTONII ANDREE*: GOMES OF LISBON'S LIFE AND WORKS

Gomes of Lisbon (Gometius Hispanus Ulixbonensis, Cometius Hispanus Portugalsis, c. 1440/50?-1512) was a Portuguese Franciscan theologian that spent most of his academic life at the University of Pavia, where he lived and lectured between 1482/3 and 1511. During his lifetime, he was very influential, both as an academic and as a churchman.

We do not know anything about his life in Portugal before the beginning of his studies in Paris. The first evidence of his activity can be found in a 1478 edition of Astesanus's *Summa de casibus*

conscientiae. This edition was prepared by Gomes, among others, while he was at the Franciscan convent of Venice. In the introductory letter, written by Bartolomeo Bellati (the editor of the juridical notes), we can gather the information that he studied in Paris and was a bachelor (*baccalaureus*) in theology¹.

During the academic year of 1482/1483, Gomes of Lisbon is referred to as *magister Gomecius Hispanus* in the *Rotuli salariatorum* of the University of Pavia². In this year, he started his lectures on theology and taught a minor chair, usually assigned to bachelors, called *Lecturae metaphysicae in festis*. It is the beginning of a long career in Pavia, where he lived until 1511.

There are plenty of documents that show Gomes's overwhelming reputation. He was the most reputed theologian of the University of Pavia. As member of the *collegium theologorum*, as well as the medical and artistical *collegium*, Gomes was responsible for the proofs and titles of hundreds of students, including the famous Dominican Tommaso de Vio. As the University of Pavia was the main intellectual centre of the duchy of Milan, he was close to the court of Ludovico Sforza.

Inside his order, Gomes became *lector regens* of the Franciscan convent of Pavia in 1491 and *socius ultramontanus* of the Minister General in 1493. Several testimonies and documents show that he was summoned many times to mediate conflicts and was praised for his capacity to dialogue in a period of division. In October 1511, he was nominated Vicar General and moved to Rome, where he attended the first two sessions of the Fifth Lateran Council, in May 1512. His position on the probity of the Franciscan institution of

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1. "Preterea scissimis theologorum, et quidem doctissimorum sententiis quam decoretur cuique liquet in eius proemio, quare ut castigatissimum opus dominationi tue, tanquam uni parenti ac optimo principi meo donaretur, non paruos labores subiuimus, quippe sex iam menses in eo reformando consumpsimus, multa prius excerpta fuligine, in qua diligentia Gometio ulixbonensi conreligioso meo, et in theologia doctissimo bachalario, ex studioque parisiensi precipuo familiari, nec non quibusdam iurisperitis consanguineis sum usus." ASTESANUS, *Summa de casibus conscientiae* (Johannes de Colonia-Johannes Manthen de Gherretzen, Venice, 1478) nn. pp.
 2. *Acta Studii Ticinensis* (Archivio di Stato di Pavia, Università) cartt. 21-23.

the *mons pietatis* was important at this Council. Julius II nominated him Archbishop of Nazareth in June 1512, but he died few days later and was buried in San Pietro in Montorio, in Rome³.

Gomes was much esteemed by the Franciscan mathematician Luca Pacioli, Leonardo da Vinci, the humanist Ermolao Barbaro, the Christian cabalist Paolo Ricci, and Pope Julius II. His name was celebrated in various epigrams written by the poets Henrique Caiado (Hermicus Caiadus) and Lancino Curzio⁴.

Unfortunately, none of his theological works could survive the vicissitudes of history. He was, however, the main influence and inspiration of a work by one of his disciples, who also became Vicar General (then Minister) of the Conventuals, after the split of the Order: the *Super primo libro Sententiarum doctoris subtilis Ioannis Scoti*,

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3. Cf. M. J. CORREIA, *Gomes of Lisbon (c. 1440/50?-1512): A Portuguese Scotist in the Italian Renaissance*, “Annali di Storia delle Università Italiane” 22/2 (2018) 3-26. This article updates Angel d’Ors’s article on Gomes of Lisbon and corrects some flaws. Cf. A. d’ORS, *Gometius Hispanus Ulixbonensis O.F.M. Conv. († 1513)*, “Análise” 23 (2002) 95-144. One of the corrections has to do with Gomes’s death in 1512, which in turn corrects another doubt about his possible nomination as archbishop by Pope Leo X. There is no evidence that Gomes knew the Cardinal Medici who became Pope. There is a very valuable document that describes Gomes’s last days: the memoirs of a nobleman (Fidalgo de Chaves, literally “nobleman from Chaves”, whose real name is unknown). These memoirs describe his journey to Italy, where he was gathering support and knowledge on behalf of Jaime, Fourth Duke of Bragança, and his political purposes. Fidalgo de Chaves met Gomes in Rome and attended his funeral. These memoirs were recently edited: cf. P. C. LOPES (ed.), *Memórias de um Fidalgo de Chaves. Um olhar português sobre a Itália do Renascimento* (Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Lisboa, 2017) 97.
 4. Cf. L. PACIOLI, *De divina proportione* (Paganus Paganinus, Venice, 1509) f. 1r. In the beginning of this edition that contains Leonardo’s drawings, there is a very laudatory description of a reunion at the court of Ludovico Sforza, dated February 9th 1498, in which Gomes of Lisbon was present together with Ludovico Sforza, Galeazzo Sforza, Luca Pacioli and his collaborator and friend Leonardo da Vinci. He is presented by Pacioli as “del nostro sacro seraphico ordine el reuerendo padre e sublime theologo Maestro Gometio”. Cf. also ERMOLAO BARBARO, *Epistolae, orationes et carmina* (Bibliopolis, Florence, 1943) 10-11; PAULUS RICCIUS, *Nuper a iudaismo ad sacram Christi religionem translati compendium* (Giacomio Pocatela, Pavia, 1507) especially Gomes’s preface; HERMICUS CAIADUS, *Aecoglae et sylvae et epigrammata* (Benedictus Hectoreus, Bologna, 1501) ff. 91v-92r; LANCINO CURZIO, *Epigrammaton libri decem* (Philippus Foyot, Milano, 1521) ff. 4r-v, 34r, 46v, 76v-77r.

by Giovanni Vigerio⁵. Gomes is also the main character in the dialogue *In apostolorum symbolum* by the prominent Christian cabalist Paolo Ricci⁶. His character argues with three Jewish brothers about the conformity between the cabalistic knowledge of the names of God, the Catholic *Credo*, and Aristotelian philosophy.

Only three of Gomes's works are available today: the *Questio perutilis de cuiuscumque scientie subiecto, principaliter tamen naturalis philosophie* (c. 1485 – 1492?)⁷; the *Questio an licita sit institutio Montis Pietatis* (1491)⁸; and the *Scriptum super Questiones Metaphisice Antonii Andree* (c. 1483 – 1511?)⁹. In the present article, I intend to present the last of these works, especially regarding Gomes's disagreements with the ways Antonius Andree reads Scotus.

The text of the *Scriptum* is extant in one manuscript: Oxford, Bodleian Library, ms. Add. C. 73. Most of the codex was written by Thomas Murchio of Genoa, a famous doctor who edited the works of Arnaldus of Vilanova¹⁰. However, the part of the manuscript which contains Gomes's commentary on Andree seems to have been written by a different hand. This codex can be divided into four main parts:

1) Thomas Murchio's copy of Bessarion's new translation of the *Metaphysics* (ff. 2r-155v). This part was surely written in September 1493, during Murchio's studies on arts and medicine at the University of Pavia.

5. Cf. JOHANNES VIGERIUS, *Super primo libro Sententiarum doctoris subtilis Ioannis Scoti* (Johannes Tacuinus, Venice, 1527).

6. Cf. PAULUS RICCIUS, *In apostolorum symbolum* (Johann Miller, Augsburg, 1514).

7. GOMES DE LISBOA, *Questão muito útil sobre o sujeito de qualquer ciência, principalmente, porém, o da filosofia natural. Questio perutilis de cuiuscumque scientie subiecto, principaliter tamen naturalis philosophie*. Bilingual edition M. J. CORREIA (Edições Afrontamento, Porto, 2016).

8. GOMETIUS ULISBONENSIS, *Questio an licita sit institutio montis pietatis*, in AA.VV., *Pro Monte Pietatis. Consilia sacrorum theologorum ac collegiorum Patavii et Perusii* (Johannes Tacuinus, Venice, [c. 1495-1498?]).

9. GOMES DE LISBOA, *Escrito sobre as Questões Metafísicas de António André. Scriptum super Questiones Metaphisice Antonii Andree*. Bilingual edition M. J. CORREIA (Edições Afrontamento, Porto, 2018).

10. Cf. S. GIRALT I SOLER, *Arnau de Vilanova en la imprenta renaixentista: segle XVI* (Publicacions de l'Arxiu Històric de les Ciències de la Salut, Manresa, 2002).

2) The *Scriptum super Questiones Metaphisice Antonii Andree* (ff. 157r-169r). The hand that wrote this part seems different from Thomas Murchio's. It is sloppier and has no decorated initials nor coloured margins as in the *Metaphysics* translation copy. The rubric of this part runs as follows: "Incipit in Dei nomine ac gloriosissime virginis Marie aduocate mee scriptum quoddam ubi sunt colecta aliqua a doctissimo viro magistro Cometio Hispano Portugalensi super Questiones Metaphisice Antonii Andree." The *Scriptum* is fragmentary. From the 16 questions that it designates, two of them are only mentioned, but not really commented on (book I, q. 8 and book 3, q. 3). Another one (book 1, q. 12) is discussed in one phrase. The other 13 questions are not discussed in their entirety: some particular answers and arguments are chosen, and sometimes there are complementary notes that do not really comment on a part of Andreae's text. This said, we can presume that this copy gathers some student notes of Gomes's lectures.

3) After the *Scriptum*, we can find brief notes and small copies of Duns Scotus's passages on the issue of experience (ff. 169v-172v). The hand that wrote them is more similar to Thomas Murchio's hand in the copy of the *Metaphysics* translation.

4) The last folio (f. 172v) contains a poem in Latin, although the title is in vernacular: *Io semmai el campo e altri el mete*. After the poem, there is a curious note about the bravery of Thomas Murchio, who commanded a fleet of ten ships against a group of pirates, near Malta.

From the gathered information, both internal and contextual, it is impossible to date accurately Gomes's *Scriptum*. It is possible that it is a student report of his lessons on metaphysics in 1482/1483. There is no evidence that he taught metaphysics ever again. Nonetheless, the part of the manuscript which contains the *Scriptum* was written at least ten years later. So, the *Scriptum* can be placed any time in Gomes's teaching years.

Before the exposition of the points of disagreement between Gomes of Lisbon and Antonius Andreae, it is important to give a general overview of the work that is being commented on.

Antonius Andreae's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, intitled *Scriptum super Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, was written at the beginning

of the 14th century in the context of his teachings on the convents of the Franciscan custody of Lleida. It was divided into two autonomous parts shortly after being spread and used as a study tool: the *expositio litteralis* and the *quaestiones*. In the famous Wadding edition of Scotus, the *expositio* was edited as written by the *Doctor subtilis* himself, with the title *In XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*. Today, we know that this attribution is wrong¹¹. On the other hand, the *quaestiones* were so popular that they are witnessed by at least 56 manuscripts and 21 old editions (printed between 1471 and 1523). They are based on the equivalent questions of Scotus, albeit with fundamental changes. Scotus's questions cover only nine of the twelve books of the *Metaphysics*. Andreae completed this hiatus by taking positions from the *Sentences* commentary and the *Quodlibet*. In the first nine books, Andreae sometimes literally copies Scotus's questions. Other times, he systematizes and does a work of internal reordering, so that the doctrines become clearer and easier to use in the teaching context. Moreover, he changes some of Scotus's doctrines which would have been abandoned in later works. He does so by citing long passages from the *Sentences*. Especially from book VII to IX, he formulates and answers questions that have no correspondence with those dealt with by Scotus in the same place. Thus, this text is a blend between edition and original work with the goal of creating a canonical and easy to use version of Scotus's mature thought¹².

11. It is plausible that Gomes also knew that this work was written by Andreae, since the 1482 Venice edition attributes it to Andreae: cf. ANTONIUS ANDREAE, *Scriptum aureum super Metaphysicam Aristotelis* (Antonius de Strata, Venice, 1482).

12. About this work cf. M. CABRÉ DURAN, *Antoni Andreu (ca. 1280-1335), Comentador de la Metafísica d'Aristòtil. Una reconstrucció de la univocitat del concepte d'ésser* (PhD thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, 2018) especially 231-302; J. MENSA I VALLS, *Antoni Andreu, mestre escotista. Balanç d'un segle d'estudis* (Institut d'Estudis Catalans-Facultat de Teologia de Catalunya, Barcelona, 2017); C. BÉRUBÉ, *Antoine André. Témoin et Interprète de Scot*, "Antoninianum" 54 (1979) 386-446; W. O. DUBA, *Three Franciscan Metaphysicians after Scotus: Antonius Andreae, Francis of Marchia, and Nicholas Bonet* in F. AMERINI, G. GALUZZO (eds.), *A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2014) 413-493; M. GENSLER, *Antonius Andreas: Scotism's Best Supporting actor*, "Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia" 9 (1997) 57-79; G. PINI, *Scotistic Aristotelianism: Antonius Andreas' Expositio and Quaestiones on the Meta-*

Gomes of Lisbon's commentary is an important witness of the use of Antonius Andreae's *Quaestiones* in the Renaissance. Here is the list of the questions commented on by Gomes, even though we do not know if this selection of questions was his choice or the copyist's:

<Q. 1> Lib. I, q. 1: *Utrum ens inquantum ens sit subiectum metaphisice* [Whether being as being is the subject of metaphysics, 157r-161r]

<Q. 2> Lib. I, q. 5: *Queritur utrum ex experimentis generetur ars* [Whether art is generated from experience, 161r-161v]

<Q. 3> Lib. I, q. 6: *Utrum expertus habens artem certius operetur artifice non experto* [Whether the expert possessing art operates with more certainty than a non-expert artist, 161v-162r]

<Q. 4> Lib. I, q. 7: *Utrum actus omnes et generationes sint circa singularia* [Whether every act and generation are about the singulars, 162r-163r]

<Q. 5> Lib. I, q. 8: *Utrum obiectum per se sensus sit aliquid sub ratione singularitatis* [Whether the *per se* object of sense is something under the reason of singularity, 163r. Announced, but not commented upon]

<Q. 6> Lib. I, q. 9: *Utrum methaphisicus consideret omnes quidditates rerum in particulari* [Whether the metaphysician considers every quiddity of things in particular, 163r-163v]

<Q. 7> Lib. I, q. 10: *Utrum magis uniuersalia sint magis difficilia ad cognoscendum* [Whether the most universal things are harder to be known, 163v-164r]

<Q. 8> Lib. I, q. 11: *Utrum methaphisica sit scientia pratica uel speculatiua* [Whether metaphysics is a practical or a speculative science, 164r-166r]

<Q. 9> Lib. I, q. 12: *Utrum speculatiua sit nobilior pratica* [Whether the speculative sciences are nobler than the practical sciences, 166r. The commentary has only one phrase: "It is clear by

physics, in L. SILEO (ed.), *Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti: Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale. Roma 9-11 marzo 1993* (PAA-Edizioni Antonianum, Rome, 1995) vol. I, 375-390.

itself, because if some speculative science is nobler than any practical science humanely discovered (I say this because of theology), then the speculative science is absolutely nobler than the practical science."¹³]

<Q. 10> Lib. II, q. 1: *Utrum principia sint nobis naturaliter cognita* [Whether principles are naturally known by us, 166r]

<Q. 11> Lib. II, q. 2: *Utrum difficultas cognoscendi res sit ex parte intellectus nostri, aut ex parte rerum* [Whether the difficulty to know things comes from our intellect or from things, 166v]

<Q. 12> Lib. II, q. 3: *Utrum substantie immateriales possint apprehendi secundum suas quidditates in statu isto* [Whether immaterial substances can be apprehended according to their quiddities in our present state, 166v-167v]

<Q. 13> Lib. III, q. 2: *Utrum genus predicetur per se de differentia* [Whether a genus is predicated *per se* of the difference, 167v-168r]

<Q. 14> Lib. III, q. 3: *Utrum <nunc uel instans> sit idem in toto tempore* [Whether now, or the instant, is equal in all the time, 168r. Announced, but not commented upon]

<Q. 15> Lib. IV, q. 1: *Utrum ens uniuoce predicetur* [Whether being is predicated univocally, 168r-168v]

<Q. 16> Lib. IV, q. 2: *Utrum negatio dicat distinctam formalitatem ab affirmatione* [Whether a negation expresses a formality that is distinct from the <corresponding> affirmation, ff. 168v-169r]

By looking at the titles of the questions, we can verify that they cover a good number of theories and issues proper of his tradition, especially Scotistic issues, such as the univocity of being. With the remark that these questions are possibly the choice of the copyist, there are clearly two dominant themes that may reflect the main worries of Gomes and his context.

The first one is the relation between cognition, experience, and demonstration. At the University of Pavia, the most reputed disciplines in the arts and medical faculty were the medical ones. In

13. "Clara est de se, quia si aliqua speculatiua est nobilior quacumque practica humanitus inuenta (quod dico propter theologiam), ergo speculatiua est simpliciter nobilior practica."

what concerns the arts, the most respected professors were the ones who taught natural philosophy, since it was an essential subject for the preparation of future doctors. It is not surprising that Gomes tends to deal often with demonstration *quia* and *propter quid*, and with the way we use the powers of the soul to obtain primary truths so that, from them, we can build deductive sciences. It is also his main topic in the *Questio perutilis de cuiuscumque subiecto*, where he argues against Nicoletto Vernia, a famous natural philosopher of the University of Padua, about the subject-matter of physics¹⁴.

The second dominant theme is the discussion of the Scotistic terminology of the so called *formalizantes*, i.e., the authors that propose several taxonomies of distinction, based on a tradition that comes from Francis of Meyronnes, Peter Thomae and an anonymous *Tractatus formalitatum*¹⁵. In fact, Gomes is permanently using the terminology created by this tradition: the pair *se totis obiective* vs. *se totis subiective*, the notion of *formalitas*, the *distinctio ex natura rei*, etc. It is also a theme proper to his time and context. His fellow Franciscan Antonio Trombetta, metaphysician at the University of Padua, wrote a treatise on the *formalitates*. In 1505, in Venice, Maurice O’Fihely (Mauricius Hibernicus) published a collection of works by Trombetta, Antoine Sirect (Antonius Sirectius) and Étienne Brulefer (Stephanus Burlifer) on this topic¹⁶.

14. Cf. the introduction of GOMES DE LISBOA, *Questão muito útil sobre o sujeito de qualquer ciência, principalmente, porém, o da filosofia natural. Questio perutilis de cuiuscumque scientie subiecto, principaliter tamen naturalis philosophie*. Bilingual edition M. J. CORREIA (Edições Afrontamento, Porto, 2016). Gomes’s theory of *continentia virtualis* as the single criterion for ascribing a particular subject matter to a science was influential in a question on the subject matter of metaphysics by Giacomino Malafossa. Cf. C.A. ANDERSEN, *Scotist Metaphysics in Mid-Sixteenth Century Padua: Giacomino Malafossa from Barge’s A Question on the Subject of Metaphysics*, “*Studia Neoaristotelica*” 17 (2020) 69-107.

15. On this tradition, cf. Claus A. Andersen’s introduction to PETRUS THOMAE, *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum* C. LÓPEZ ALCALDE, J. BATALLA (eds.) (Obrador Edendum, Santa Coloma de Queralt, 2011).

16. Cf. ANTONIUS TROMBETTA, ANTONIUS SIRECTIUS, STEPHANUS BURLIFER, MAURICIUS HIBERNICUS, *Magistri Antonii Trombete in tractatum formalitatum Scoti sententia, formalitates Antonii Syreti de mente eiusdem Scoti, necnon Stephani Burlifer cum nouis additionibus et concordantiis magistri Mauricii Hibernici in margine decorate* (Mauricius Hibernicus, Venice, 1505).

But perhaps the most interesting feature of Gomes's commentary is the fact that he sometimes corrects Antonius Andreae for not interpreting Scotus correctly. In the next chapter, I am going to focus on these disagreements.

2. GOMES OF LISBON'S DISAGREEMENTS WITH ANTONIUS ANDREAE

Throughout the questions, there are five issues where Gomes of Lisbon disagrees with the way Antonius Andreae interprets Duns Scotus: a) the *prima divisio* of *ens* is not the division between *ens finitum* and *ens infinitum*, but the division between *ens quantum* and *ens non quantum*; b) the *passiones entis* are equally primary and it is impossible to deduce them from one another; c) the agent intellect does not imprint a spiritual form in the *phantasm* in order to overcome the disproportion between the sensible and the intelligible; d) the metaphysician deals not only with the *quidditas in universali*, but also with the *quidditas in particulari*; and e) if Andreae's concept of *formalitas* is correct, it is impossible to say that negations have a formality at all, despite the fact that the correspondent affirmation includes or excludes perfections.

My goal is to present the reasons behind these disagreements and to compare Gomes's positions with those of his contemporaries, trying to find, at least, indirect discussion partners. With this exercise, I also hope to give some insights on the panorama of Scotistic philosophy in the Renaissance, emphasizing the influence of Antonius Andreae.

a) *The prima divisio entis*

The first disagreement occurs in the first question, about the subject-matter of metaphysics. In this question, several other complementary topics are addressed, such as the first division of the univocal concept of being (*ens*)¹⁷. Gomes of Lisbon interprets

17. Cf. ANTONIUS ANDREAE, *Questiones acutissime super duodecim libros Methaphisice*

Scotus differently from Andreae. He considers that the first division of being must be the division between *ens quantum* and *ens non-quantum*, and not between *ens finitum* and *ens infinitum*, as Andreae states:

Notice that Antonius Andreae says that the first division of being is between finite and infinite. However, that is not the first division of being in its most common meaning, since there is another one which is prior: the one that divides being in quantum and non quantum, as Scotus declares in the *Quodlibet*, question 5, speaking about quantity of power [*quantitas virtutis*]. The relations within divine things, which are neither formally finite, nor formally infinite, are placed under *non quantum*; <they are> not formally infinite, because if they were, there would be two formally infinite things in God; nor formally finite, because then God would include in himself a finite entity, and consequently some imperfection¹⁸.

As we can see from the quotation, for Gomes, the problem arises when one addresses the divine Persons. The relations of paternity, filiation and spiration cannot be formally finite, since finitude is not compatible with infinite being, nor formally infinite, as it is absurd to pose several infinite entities in God. Thus, the relations inside the Trinity cannot have any kind of quantity, not even the *quantitas virtutis*, or quantity of perfection, which is a non-categorical, transcendent quantity. If the subject-matter of metaphysics ought to be common to all real things, it must accommodate all the possible

(Wolfgang Stöckel, Leipzig, before 1494) lib. I, q. 1, ff. 2rb-8rb.

18. “Nota quod Antonius Andreas dicit primam diuisionem entis esse in finitum et in infinitum. Hec tamen non est prima diuisio entis communissime accepti, sed alia est prior ista, qua ens diuiditur per quantum et per non quantum, ut declarat Scotus in Quolibetis, questione V, loquendo de quantitate virtutis. Sub non quanto reponuntur relationes in diuinis, que non sunt formaliter finite nec formaliter infinite; non formaliter infinite, quia tunc essent duo formaliter infinita in Deo; nec formaliter finite, quia tunc Deus includeret in se aliquam entitatem finitam, et per consequens aliquam imperfectionem.” GOMES DE LISBOA, *Scriptum*, op. cit., q. 1, 72.

cases. Hence the need to establish a primary division that precedes the pair of disjunctive transcendentals finite vs infinite.

This same doctrine can be found in another author, namely the already mentioned Antonio Trombetta, who taught at the University of Padua roughly in the same period in which Gomes taught at Pavia. In his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, printed in 1504, Trombetta develops this doctrine further than Gomes. *Paternitas*, *filiatio* and *spiratio passiva* cannot have a *quantitas virtutis* and a transcendent degree of perfection as the quantitative beings have, God included. If that would be the case, then a divine Person would have some perfections which the other divine Persons would not. On the other hand, if something is formally infinite, it means that it is *simpliciter* primary. Therefore, as no relation can be *simpliciter* primary – since something absolute always precedes it – it is impossible for a relation to be infinite. As Trombetta sees it, these passions of being are more intimate (*intimiora*) to God than his own infinity¹⁹.

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19. “Est primo aduertendum quod opinio Doctoris Subtilis est quod ens prima diuisionem diuiditur per quantum et non quantum. Intelligendo per quantum quod includit quantitatem virtutis, et aliquem gradum perfectionalem; per non quantum intelligendo relationes diuinas, sicut paternitas in patre, filiatio in filio, spiratio passiva in spiritu, scilicet, ista non possunt esse quanta. Declaratur, quia si sic, cum paternitas sit in patre formaliter et non in filio, filius careret formaliter aliqua perfectione quam haberet pater, scilicet, illa quam includeret ipsa paternitas. Declaratur hoc idem aliter: si, enim, paternitas continet quantitatem virtutis aut esset finita, aut infinita; non est dandum primum, quia omne finitum (cum habeat rationem partis respectu infiniti et excedatur ab ipso) habet rationem imperfecti (...); non potest etiam dici quod paternitas in patre diuino sit infinita formaliter, quia omne formaliter infinitum est ens primum simpliciter, per cuius accessum et recessum mensuratur quodlibet ens quantum; sed nullus respectus potest esse primum simpliciter, quia absolutum est prius respectiuo; ergo paternitas in patre non potest esse formaliter infinita.” [First, it should be noticed that the Subtle Doctor's opinion is that the first division of being is between *quantum* and *non quantum*. *Quantum* is to be understood as what includes quantity of power (*quantitas virtutis*) and a degree of perfection; *non quantum* is to be understood as the divine relations, such as paternity in the Father, filiation in the Son, and passive spiration in the Spirit, which cannot be quantified (*quanta*). This clear, because, if they were <quantified>, as paternity is formally in the Father and not in the Son, the Son would lack formally a perfection that the Father had, i.e., the <perfections> which would include paternity. This is also clear in other manner: in fact, if paternity contains quantity of power, it would be either finite, or infinite; the first is impossible, because every finite (which has the reason of part in what concerns the infinite, and is exceeded by it) has the reason of imperfection (...); it

Clearly, then, this problem is not a peculiarity of the Portuguese author. He rather participates in an on-going discussion within the Scotist tradition.

b) The passionnes entis

The second dissent between Gomes and Andreae also emerges in the question about the subject-matter of metaphysics. There is a difficulty that must be addressed by anyone who poses being *qua* being as the subject-matter of metaphysics. As being *qua* being has no definition (in a proper sense, i.e., a genus and a difference) and is a *purum quid*, it is impossible to demonstrate passions from it. Without these passions, there cannot be a science, for they serve as the middle term of demonstrations.

Gomes disagrees on the way Antonius Andreae tries to overcome this problem. Andreae considers the possibility to deduce the *passiones entis* from one another, although in a broad and imperfect sense. *Unum*, which would be a primary passion of *ens*, could be used to demonstrate *verum*, and *verum*, in its turn, could be used to demonstrate *bonum*:

Although there may be a better judgement about the other passions—it is complicated and hard to see this about all the passions of being—it seems that one [*unum*] is the first passion of being in an absolute sense (...). After one, true seems to be the second, and good the third. In fact, the reason of truth seems to be prior by nature to the reason of goodness, since the intellect is naturally prior to the will. This could be said consequently

is also not to be said that paternity in the Father is formally infinite, because every formal infinity is the first being in an absolute sense, from which we measure any quantitative being; but no relation (*respectus*) can be the first being in an absolute sense, because the absolute is prior to the relative; hence, paternity in the Father cannot be formally infinite.] ANTONIUS TROMBETTA, *Antonii Trombette Patauini minoriste theologi opus in Methaphysicam Aristotelis Padue in thomistas discussum, cum questionibus perutilissimis antiquioribus adiectis in optimam seriem redactis, et formalitates eiusdem cum additionibus et dilucidatione diligenti exculte* ([Jacopo Pencio?], Venice, 1504) lib. I, q. 1, ff. 2rb-2va.

about the other passions by a subtler doctor: if, in this way, one can be assumed as a middle term to prove and demonstrate that being is true, and true to prove that being is good, then <we could continue> like this to the other <passions>²⁰.

Gomes of Lisbon criticizes this attempt. He argues that, according to Scotus, all the *passiones entis* flow immediately from *ens*, since it is possible to produce immediate propositions with them, such as “truth is being”, or “good is being”. There is no order among them. The only demonstration that can be made is to show inductively that each and every thing has these passions, and this is enough to preserve the scientific status of metaphysics. More than that, Gomes also thinks that in this matter, metaphysics is a higher science. In his words, it is *intellectus*, not *scientia*, which means that there is an immediate kind of knowledge that needs no demonstration²¹.

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20. “Respondeo saluo meliori iudicio quicquid sit de aliis passionibus quia nimis prolixum et difficile esset videre hoc de omnibus passionibus entis, tamen videtur quod unum sit simpliciter prima passio entis (...). Post unum videtur esse secunda verum, tertia autem bonum. Nam ratio veritatis videtur esse prior ex natura rei ratione bonitatis, sicut intellectus naturaliter est prior voluntate. Sic potest dici de aliis passionibus consequenter quod subtiliori doctori relinquo, quod si ita est ipsum unum potest sumi pro medio ad probandum et demonstrandum ens esse verum, et verum ad probandum ens esse bonum et sic de aliis.”. ANTONIUS ANDREAE, *op. cit.*, ff. 6rb-6va.
21. “Et dicit Antonius Andreas quod passiones habent ordinem, sicut in littera. Licet videre tamen istud est contra mentem Scoti, qui dicit quod omnes passiones immediate fluunt ab ente et una non demonstratur de ente per aliam, sed omnes sunt indemonstrabiles, quia omnes secundum Scotum faciunt propositiones immediatas cum ente, ut ‘veritas est ens’ est immediata, et sic de aliis, et per consequens indemonstrabiles, quia non habent medium per quod possint demonstrari. Et ideo, si diceretur contra: quia quod est perfectionis in scientia non debet negari in scientia perfectissima; sed posse demonstrare passionem est perfectionis in qualibet scientia; ergo et cetera. Dicitur quod methaphisica, quoad proprias passiones, non dicitur esse scientia, sed intellectus; modo intellectus est perfectior habitus quam scientia (...)”. [And Antonius Andrae says that the passions have an order. However, this is against Scotus’s thought, who says that all the passions immediately flow from being, and that one of them is not demonstrated through another, but they all are indemonstrable, since, according to Scotus, all of them make immediate propositions with being, such as “truth is being”, etc. Consequently, they are indemonstrable, because they do not have a middle term through which they can be demonstrated. Thus, if one said, against this, that what is a perfection in a science must not be negated in the most perfect science; but being able to demonstrate a passion is a perfection in any science; hence, etc.:

Regarding this problem, too, there was a rich discussion among Gomes's contemporary Scotists. Just to give some examples, Nicholas of Orbellis (c. 1400 – 1475) copies almost *verbatim* Antonius Andreae's response. Peter Tartaret (? –1522), a renowned Scotist theologian at the University of Paris, says something very similar to Gomes of Lisbon, namely, that all the passions of being produce immediate propositions²².

c) The disproportion between sensible and intelligible species

In book I, question 5, Antonius Andreae points out the need of sensitive cognition to obtain the knowledge of the uncomplex terms and principles from which the scientific truths are deduced. Gomes agrees with him. However, in his exposition, Andreae states that the agent intellect imprints a spiritual form in the phantasm in order to make it proportionate to the possible intellect. The possible intellect starts moving and producing the intellection of uncomplex terms only after this transformation of the phantasm:

As a matter of fact, if there is a pre-existing sensitive cognition of a particular, consequently, there are posterior cognitions that are generated in the common sense, which is called phantasy [*phantasia*]; and because that which exists in the power of phantasy is disproportionate to the moving of the possible intellect, then, according to some authors, the agent intellect attributes to it a form so that it can move the possible intellect; and in this manner, <the possible intellect> understands the uncomplex terms²³.

it should be said that metaphysics, in what concerns its proper passions, is not called a science (*scientia*), but *intellectus*; *intellectus* is a more perfect habit than a science (...)]. GOMES DE LISBOA, *Scriptum*, op. cit., q. 1, 92.

22. Cf. NICOLAUS DE ORBELLIS, *Expositio duodecim librorum Metaphisice Aristotelis secundum viam Scoti* (Henricus de Harlem-Mattheus Crescentini Bononiensis, Bologna, 1485) nn. pp.; PETRUS TARTARETUS, *Expositio super tota philosophia naturali nec non Metaphysica Aristotelis cum textu*, (Jacques Maillet, Lyon, 1498) lib. I, q. 1, f. 131ra.
23. "Nam preexistente cognitione particulari sensitiva generantur consequenter cog-

According to Gomes, this theory goes against Scotus. Andreae instantiates a certain kind of illumination of the inferior by the superior, which is something Scotus criticized in *Ordinatio*, I, d. 3, p. 1, where he delineates his theory of cognition²⁴. The Portuguese author asserts that the disproportion between the phantasm and the intellect means that it is impossible for the phantasm to receive any kind of spiritual form. In accordance with Scotus, his answer is that there is a conjunction of causes in the production of knowledge about uncomplex terms:

And one should not imagine that the agent intellect imprints a spiritual form in the phantasm, through which it becomes able to change the intellect; and therefore, one should not imagine that <the intellect> produces or receives this form as something that changes the intellect under these material conditions, because that would be impossible, since there would not be a proportion between the one that changes and the one that is changed. Hence, it is necessary to pose that the agent intellect is said to cause the species because it cooperates in the causation of the species. And “to illuminate” [*irradiare*] should be understood in this sense: not in the sense that <the intellect> attributes itself the light, but that, simultaneously with the phantasm, it causes conjointly the species. However, there is something that the agent intellect produces, which is to give the immaterial being to the species. The phantasm cannot do it by itself. Thus, neither these words by Antonius Andreae are in accordance with the common opinion, nor with Scotus’s thought²⁵.

nitiones posteriores in sensu communi, que fantasia dicitur; et sic ulterius, et quia illud quod existit in virtute fantastica, ut ibi existit, est improporcionatum ad mouendum intellectum possibilem secundum quosdam, ideo attribuitur sibi aliqua forma ab intellectu agente abstrahente quicquid sit illa forma virtute cuius potest mouere intellectum possibilem; et sic intelligit terminos incomplexos.” ANTONIUS ANDREAE, *op. cit.*, lib. I, q. 5, ff. 11vb-12ra.

24. Cf. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio*, I (*Opera Omnia*, vol. III) (Typis Poliglottis Vaticanis, The Vatican City, 1954) d. 3, p. 1, especially q. 4, nn. 202-280.

25. “Et non est imaginandum quod intellectus agens imprimat aliquam formam spir-

After this passage, Gomes gives exactly the same example as did Scotus²⁶ of the illusion of a broken stick in the water. Since the intellect has the knowledge of the hardness of the stick and the softness of water, we will never be deceived by this image.

Gomes of Lisbon seems more aware of Scotus's criticism of illumination theories than Antonius Andreae.

d) Quidditates in universali and quidditates in particulari

In book I, question 9, Antonius Andreae, following Scotus's text, argues that the metaphysician cannot have the knowledge of all the quiddities *in particulari*. If so, this would mean that all the other sciences were superfluous or subordinated to metaphysics. Since Aristotle said that there are three primary sciences, i.e., metaphysics, mathematics and physics, Andreae holds that the metaphysician only knows the quiddities *in universali*, under the formal reason of *ens*²⁷.

Gomes of Lisbon, on the contrary, thinks that Scotus's position changed. He certainly held this position in his questions on the *Metaphysics*, where he was holding the *opinio communis*. In the *Sentences* (that is, his *Ordinatio*), however, he changed his position. Gomes does not point out to a particular passage. Nonetheless, once

itualet ipsi fantasmati, mediante qua ipsum sit aptum immutare intellectum, et ideo non est imaginandum quod istam formam faciat nec recipiat, qua sub istis conditionibus materialibus immutet ipsum intellectum, quia hoc esset impossibile cum tunc non esset proportio immutantis ab immutabili; et ideo oportet ponere sicut est verum quod intellectus agens isto modo dicitur causare speciem, quia dicitur coadiuvare ad causandum speciem et isto modo intelligitur iradiare, non quod aliquod sibi lumen tribuat, sed quod, simul cum tali fantasmate, dicitur concausare speciem. Tamen facit hoc intellectus agens, quod dat tali speciei esse immateriale, quod non posset facere per se fantasma. Ideo ista dicta Antonii Andree hic non sunt secundum communem opinionem, nec secundum mentem Scoti." GOMES DE LISBOA, *Scriptum*, *op. cit.*, q. 2, 108.

26. Cf. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio*, *op. cit.*, I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 243.

27. "Aliter ergo dicendum quod ad metaphisicam in quantum talem non pertinet considerare omnes quidditates in particulari, sed in universali et sub ratione entis. Et hoc probat ratio facta: quia aliter omnes alie superfluerunt." [It should be said otherwise that it does not belong to metaphysics as such to consider all the quiddities *in particulari*, but *in universali* and under the reason of being. And the argument proves it: because otherwise, every other <science> would be superfluous.] ANTONIUS ANDREA, *op. cit.*, lib. I, q. 9, f. 16ra.

again, Antonio Trombetta states the same opinion as Gomes, referring the reader to book I, distinction 3, question 3²⁸. In this question, Duns Scotus claims that being is the primary object of the intellect, not God, and that being extends to the ultimate differences (therefore, to the proper quiddity of each thing, or to its *species specialissima*) due to *primitas virtualitatis*²⁹.

There was no consensus among the Scotists about this matter. Indeed, influenced by Andreae, the Scotists John Hennon, John le Damiosiau and Peter Tartaret (all of them connected to the University of Paris in the 15th century) do not link the problem of the first object of the intellect with this question on the knowledge of quiddities *in particulari*³⁰.

Gomes's answer is that the metaphysician studies all the quiddities *in particulari*, but only in regard to their metaphysical reasons (*rationes*). The metaphysician has a particular *modus considerandi* of them:

One should notice that, according to the Philosopher, in <book> VI of the *Metaphysics*, there are three generically distinct primary real habits, i.e., metaphysics, mathematics and natural <philosophy>, and each of these habits has its proper subject and mode of consideration [*modus considerandi*]; and thus, this is why the Philosopher says that the sciences are divided in the same manner as the things that they consider. In

28. "Illa quidditas pertinet ad metaphysicum sub ea ratione, sub qua precise considerata, includit ens vel identice vel formaliter; sed quidditas quaecumque materialis et immaterialis, precise considerata, inquantum talis includit ens formaliter vel identice; ergo maior patet (...), ut est de mente Doctoris Subtilis in primo *Sententiarum*, dist. 3, q. 3." [That kind of quiddity belongs to the metaphysician under a reason which includes being either identically, or formally, if considered in a precise sense; but any material and immaterial quiddity, considered in a precise sense, includes being formally or identically in itself; hence, the major <premise> is evident, (...) as it is in thought of the Subtle Doctor, I of the *Sentences*, distinction 3, question 3.] ANTONIUS TROMBETTA, *op. cit.*, lib. I, q. 9, f. 10rb.

29. Cf. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio*, *op. cit.*, I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3.

30. About these authors and their texts, cf. Cf. P. J. J. M., BAKKER, *Fifteenth-century Parisian Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, in F. AMERINI, G. GALLUZZO (eds.), *A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Brill, Leiden-Boston 2014) 575-629.

fact, about human being, one can have several considerations: human being as a composition of soul and body that is susceptible to that soul is subject to the consideration of the natural philosopher, and is a principle of movement and rest; as his own master [*dominus*], he is considered by moral philosophy, a different kind of subject; as a composition of ultimate act and proper genus, as rational animal, he is considered by the metaphysician. Thus, the metaphysician considers every quiddity *in particulari*, although he only considers them according to metaphysical reasons, since otherwise <metaphysics> would be every science, which is impossible³¹.

In his opinion, there is no subalternation of all the sciences to metaphysics if the metaphysician deals with all the quiddities, because there is a proper *modus considerandi* of the quiddity in each science. He exemplifies this thesis with several *modi considerandi* of the human being. For example, as a composition of soul and body, the human being is a matter of natural philosophy, but as a composition of ultimate act and proper genus (rational animal), he is considered by metaphysics.

Is this answer compatible with Scotus? It is puzzling that Gomes insists on the *modus considerandi*. In fact, when Scotus poses his answer to the question of the three primary sciences (book VI, question I, of his questions on the *Metaphysics*), he sees no value on dividing the sciences according to different abstract objects, i.e.,

31. "Ubi est notandum quod, sicut dicit Philosophus, VI Metaphisice, tres sunt habitus primi reales genere distincti, scilicet methaphisica, mathematica et naturalis, et quisque istorum habituum habet proprium suum subiectum et modum considerandi; et ideo, quia dicit Philosophus, secantur scientie quemadmodum et res de quibus sunt <scientie>. De homine, enim, varia potest haberi consideratio, scilicet: homo inquantum est compositum ex anima et corpore susceptiuo illius anime, subicitur considerationi philosophie naturalis, et est principium motus et quietis; inquantum vero est sui ipsius dominus est de consideratione philosophie moralis, que est alterius generis subiecti; inquantum est compositus ex ultimo actu et ipso genere, ut animal rationale, est de consideratione methaphisici. Methaphisicus, ergo, considerat omnes quidditates rerum in particulari, non tamen considerat illas nisi secundum rationes methaphisicas, quia aliter esset omnis scientia, quod est impossibile." GOMES DE LISBOA, *Scriptum*, *op. cit.*, q. 6, 124.

intelligibilia in metaphysics, *imaginabilia* in mathematics, and *sensibilia* in physics. What differentiates the sciences is not our consideration of their subject matter, but the subject matter itself.

One could argue that Gomes of Lisbon thinks that different considerations refer to different realities, or formalities, which seems to be the case, at least in other passages³². If so, when he speaks of metaphysical quiddities, he is talking about different real quiddities. But we are forcing something that he does not say in this context. Here, he focuses on the *modus considerandi*. More than that, he actually says that the metaphysician deals with *all* the quiddities. He does not group quiddities according to the science they belong to.

He also presents another example, where he compares the metaphysical treatment of a line with its mathematical treatment. For the metaphysician, the line is treated in its proper quiddity. The metaphysician asks if a line is a substance or a quantity, if it is a continual or a discrete quantity, etc. For the mathematician, a line is treated in its mathematical passions, such as being a longitude without latitude and depth³³.

Do these metaphysical and mathematical determinations of a line correspond to some kind of composition of quiddities or

32. He states, for example, that *quidditas*, *realitas*, *ratio formalis* and *conceptus formalis* are all the same: "Realitas secundum Scotistas potest sumi dupliciter: uno modo a re reali transcenderet siue ab ente transcenderet, ut ens diuiditur in ens in anima et ens extra animam. Et sic talis realitas potest sumi ab ente extra animam ita quod dicamus, omne illud quod est extra animam esse realitatem, et illud quod non est per actum collatium intellectus est realitas et sic quidditas. Ratio formalis, conceptus formalis, realitas, idem sunt, et isto sumitur realitas pro omni illo quod potest predicari essentialiter de aliquo, et essentialiter includi in illo, ut omnia genera subalterna et species." [According to the Scotists, *realitas* can be assumed twofold: in one mode, as a real thing transcendentally, or as being transcendentally, as being is divided in being in the soul and being outside the soul. And in this way, *realitas* can be assumed as being outside the soul, since we say that everything that is outside the soul is a *realitas*, and that which does not exist through a comparative act of the intellect is a *realitas*, and therefore a quiddity. Formal reason, formal concept and *realitas* are the same, and in this sense *realitas* is assumed as everything that can be essentially predicated of something and that can be essentially included in it, such as every genus and species.]. *Ibidem*, q. 1, 98.

33. Cf. *Ibidem*, 126.

realities within a line?³⁴ It may be Gomes's claim, but, again, he insists on the *modus considerandi* in this context.

Independently of this question, the difference between Andreae and Gomes has to do with the interpretation of Scotus's authority. According to Gomes, Scotus changed his opinion in the *Sentences* commentary. Andreae, on the contrary, sticks with the opinion expressed in the questions on the *Metaphysics*. He does not recognize a link between the theme of the first object of the intellect and the theme of the knowledge of quiddities *in particulari*.

e) *The notion of formalitas*

Finally, the last disagreement has to do with book IV, question 2, about the formality of negations. It is inaccurate to say that Gomes disagrees with Andreae. What he argues is that Andreae's notion of *formalitas* forbids him to say that negations have a formality that is distinct from their corresponding affirmation. He does not discard Andreae's definition of formality, but he rather creates a broader one of his own.

Antonius Andreae holds that, if an affirmation expresses a perfection about its subject, then its corresponding negation has the same formality, for the reason that it has the same conceivability (*conceptibilitas*). For instance, in order to state that "man is not a

34. Interestingly, there is a debate between Todd Bates and Giorgio Pini about the relation between logic and metaphysics in Scotus that resembles this dissent between Gomes and Andreae. Pini accuses Bates of proposing "the formalist view" of Scotus. He seems to have in mind something similar to what Gomes is proposing here: "According to this view, reality is sliced up in items that closely parallel the concepts by which we understand it. (...) The reason I call this view 'the formalistic view' is that each of John's components (his individual property, humanity, animality, rationality, and so on up to substantiality) is called, in Scotus's jargon, a formality. The first defining feature of a formality is that it cannot exist independently, i.e., without the individual that it constitutes. The second defining feature of a formality is that it is nevertheless distinguished from the individual that it constitutes and from the other formalities within that individual no matter whether we think of it as a separate constituent of reality or not." G. PINI, *How is Scotus Logic Related to His Metaphysics? A Reply to Todd Bates*, in L. A. NEWTON (ed.), *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories* (Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2008) 277.

donkey" (*homo non est asinus*), one supposes a positive content that is implied in "man is man" (*homo est homo*)³⁵. However, if the affirmation excludes a perfection, they have different formalities. He exemplifies the second case with the affirmation "God is a donkey" (*Deus est asinus*). The negation of it, "God is not a donkey", states a perfection about God, while the affirmation is excluding perfections. In this sense, they imply different formalities about God³⁶.

According to Gomes of Lisbon, if the *significatum formalis* is reduced to the meaning of something real and positive, Andreae's answer does not make any sense. He assumes that negations point to

35. "Prima conclusio est ista: negatio non habet distinctam formalitatem ab affirmatione quam includit et supponit. Hanc ostendo sic: quod non habet distinctam conceptibilitatem ex natura rei a conceptibilitate alterius non habet distinctam formalitatem a formalitate illius; sed negatio est huiusmodi respectu affirmationis quam includit et supponit; ergo et cetera. (...) / Confirmatur, quia impossibile [ms. possibile] est intelligere negatiuam hanc, 'homo non est asinus', nisi intelligatur homo qui subicitur in illa propositione negatiua. Intelligendo autem hominem intelligitur virtualiter quod homo est homo, quare negatio illa non potest intelligi sine illa affirmatiua quam supponit." [The first conclusion is this: a negation does not have a formality that is distinct from <its corresponding> affirmation which it includes and supposes. This I prove in the following way: when one <item> does not have a conceivability that is distinct *ex natura rei* from the conceivability of another <item>, it does not have a distinct formality from the formality of the other; but negation is like this relatively to the affirmation it includes and supposes; hence, etc. (...) / <The conclusion> is confirmed, since it is impossible to understand this negative <proposition>, "man is not a donkey", unless one understands man, which is the subject in that negative proposition. However, when one understands man, one understands virtually that man is man, because that negation cannot be understood without the affirmative <proposition> it supposes.] ANTONIUS ANDREAE, *op. cit.*, lib. IV, q. 2, f. 30ra.

36. "Secunda conclusio sit ista: negatio habet distinctam formalitatem ab affirmatione quam destruit et excludit. Hanc ostendo sic: illa quorum unum dicit perfectionem simpliciter et aliud imperfectionem ex natura rei habent distinctas conceptibilitates et formalitates; sed in Deo non esse asinum dicit perfectionem simpliciter et sua affirmatio quam excludit dicit imperfectionem ex natura rei, scilicet, Deum esse asinum, et hoc ex natura rei, sicut patet; ergo negatio et affirmatio habent distinctas formalitates." [The second conclusion is this: a negation has a formality that is distinct from <its corresponding> affirmation which it destroys and excludes. This I prove in the following way: when one <item> expresses a perfection in an absolute sense and another <expresses> an imperfection, they have distinct conceivabilities and formalities; but in God, "not being a donkey" expresses a perfection in an absolute sense, and its affirmation, which it excludes, expresses an imperfection *ex natura rei*, namely "God is a donkey", and this is *ex natura rei*, as is clear; hence, negation and affirmation have distinct formalities.] *Ibidem*, f. 30ra-b.

a formality that is included in the affirmation, and this is impossible. A negation is, formally speaking, a *purum nihil*, and so, it is never included in the concept of the affirmation³⁷.

Andreae, in fact, makes this reduction of the *significatum formalis* by stating the following definition of *formalitas*:

A formality is an objective reason [*ratio obiectalis*] in the thing apprehended by the intellect by nature. It is not necessary that this <objective reason> moves the intellect, but it can determine the act of the intellect³⁸.

Gomes has a different definition of *formalitas*, as he does not limit it to the *res apprehensa ab intellectu ex natura rei*:

A formality is that which, through the formal meaning of the thing, formally expresses such a thing in its formal meaning. And in this sense, any being has a formality, either *per se*, or *per accidens*, or in any other way. The chimera also has its own formality according to its possibility, i.e., its meaning, and that meaning can be introduced confusedly or distinctly: confusedly by the defined [*diffinitum*], or by the name; distinctly, by the definition [*diffinitio*]³⁹.

37. "Ideo, prima conclusio Antonii Andree est falsa secundum mentem Scoti, ubi dicit quod 'negatio non habet distinctam formalitatem ab affirmatione quam includit', quia presupponit quod negatio dicat aliquam formalitatem que includitur in affirmatione, et hoc est impossibile, quia nunquam in conceptu affirmationis potest includi aliqua negatio, cum sit purum nihil." [Thus, Antonius Andreae's first conclusion, where he says that "negation does not have a distinct formality from the affirmation that includes", is wrong according to Scotus's thought, because it presupposes that a negation expresses some kind of formality which is included in the affirmation, and that is impossible, since it never happens that a negation is included in the concept of an affirmation, as it is a pure nothing.] GOMES DE LISBOA, *Scriptum*, *op. cit.*, q. 16, 172.

38. "Formalitas est ratio obiectalis in re apprehensa ab intellectu ex natura rei, quam non oportet semper mouere intellectum dummodo actum intellectus possit terminare." ANTONIUS ANDREA, *op. cit.*, lib. IV, q. 2, f. 29va.

39. "Formalitas est per significatum formale rei illud quod talis res formaliter in suo formali significato importatur, et isto modo quodlibet ens, siue reale siue rationis, siue ens per se siue per accidens siue quomodocumque habet formalitatem. Etiam chimera habet suam formalitatem talem qualem potest, id est, suum significatum

This definition seems bizarre and repetitive. I could not find any other author who holds it⁴⁰. Generally, a formality always presupposes a conception *ex natura rei*. For Gomes, instead, a formality is simply what expresses or what is introduced (*importatur*) by the formal meaning of something, be it a real being, be it a being of reason. In this sense, each and every object of the intellect has a formality.

What Gomes wants to point out is that, if we assume Andreae's definition, it is not possible to state that negations have a *formalitas* in any case. Thus, he tacitly differentiates non-identity and positive determination.

3. CONCLUSION

In this article, I have shown how the authority of Scotus was discussed in the Renaissance. I have also demonstrated the importance of the figure of Antonius Andreae within this tradition. His interpretation of Scotus was often accepted as the standard opinion, though at other times, it was subjected to critical scrutiny.

et talem significatum potest importari confuse uel distincte: confuse per diffinitum siue per nomen; distincte per ipsam diffinitionem." GOMES DE LISBOA, *Scriptum*, *op. cit.*, q. 16, 170-172.

40. Here are some examples of definitions of *formalitas* among the Scotists: "...illa distinguuntur formaliter, quaecumque ita se habent, quod unum ab alio ultimate abstractum non includit quidditative reliquum." PETRUS THOMAE, *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*, *op. cit.*, 3, 292.

"Alio modo accipitur <forma> pro quacumque ratione sub qua ex natura rei aliquid potest concipi. Et ab ista forma ultimo modo sumitur formalitas de qua intendimus. (...) Ideo formalitas hic intenta nihil aliud est quam ratio obiectalis sub qua unaqueque res concipi potest ex natura rei." ANTONIUS SIRECTIUS, *Formalitates moderniores de mente clarissimi doctoris Scoti*, in ANTONIUS TROMBETTA, ANTONIUS SIRECTIUS, STEPHANUS BURLIFER, MAURICIUS HIBERNICUS, *op. cit.*, f. 25v.

"Alio modo accipitur <forma> pro quacumque ratione sub qua ex natura rei aliquid potest concipi. Et ab ista forma ultimo modo sumitur formalitas de qua intendimus. (...) Ideo formalitas hic intenta nihil aliud est quam ratio obiectalis sub qua unaqueque res concipi potest ex natura rei." ANTONIUS TROMBETTA, *In tractatum formalitatum Scoticarum sententia*, in ANTONIUS TROMBETTA, ANTONIUS SIRECTIUS, STEPHANUS BURLIFER, MAURICIUS HIBERNICUS, *op. cit.*, art. 1, f. 2rb.

The points of disagreement between Gomes of Lisbon and Antonius Andreae instantiate the richness of the *nuances* within the Scotist tradition. My reading of these points of disagreement is that Gomes generally is out to establish a what we could call a Scotist orthodoxy, that is, he is always keen to find out what Scotus's original position was. Gomes was aware of Andreae's general purpose of holding what he considered to be Scotus's mature thought in each question and his disagreements are always grounded on a different approach to this general purpose. It is a matter of presenting an authority flawlessly. Does this mean that Gomes is unoriginal? By no means. Working and reworking the same authority in every detail possible—in the present case, within the Scotist tradition—is not the same as doing a superfluous repetition. For instance, Gomes's disagreement on the *prima divisio* of being and the demonstrability of the properties of being instantiates a different viewpoint on how to build a transcendental philosophy. Their disagreement on the passage from the sensible to the intelligible show a different approach in what concerns the role of experience in the production of knowledge. The subtle discussions about affirmation and negation also create subtle distinctions between non-identity and difference.

Worthy of special attention is furthermore the similarity between Gomes of Lisbon and Antonio Trombetta. In fact, their interpretations of Scotus often coincide as I have shown in 2a), 2b) and 2c).

Finally, it should be stressed that Gomes of Lisbon is at a cross-road of important philosophical and historical developments. Thus, his works throw new light on the development of philosophy in the context of the Italian Renaissance. Attention to the fascinating figure of Gomes of Lisbon and his *Scriptum super Questiones Metaphisice Antonii Andree* opens up a new perspective on this period's intellectual history

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