
How to cite this article:

PUENTE, S., PELLEGRINI, S. & GRASSAU, D.,
"Journalistic challenges in television
coverage of disasters: lessons from the
February 27, 2010, earthquake in Chile",
*Communication&Society/Comunicación y
Sociedad*, Vol. 26, n. 4, 2013, pp. 103-125.

**Journalistic challenges in television coverage of disasters: lessons from
the February 27, 2010, earthquake in Chile**

***Desafíos periodísticos en la cobertura televisiva de desastres: lecciones del
terremoto del 27 de febrero de 2010 en Chile***

SOLEDAD PUENTE, SILVIA PELLEGRINI, DANIELA GRASSAU

spuente@uc.cl, spellegrini@uc.cl, dgrassau@uc.cl

Soledad Puente. Universidad Católica de Chile, Facultad de Comunicaciones. 8331150
Santiago de Chile.

Silvia Pellegrini. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Facultad de Comunicaciones.
8331150 Santiago de Chile.

Daniela Grassau. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Facultad de Comunicaciones.
8331150 Santiago de Chile.

Submitted: May 9, 2013

Approved: June 19, 2013

ABSTRACT: In situations of high distress in which social reality and news routines are deeply altered, journalism common practices are challenged by the exceptional circumstances and by the informative needs of the population. This paper faces these challenges through the analysis on how journalists, editors y directors from the four most important television stations in Chile reacted during the coverage of the February 27, 2010 earthquake in that country, one of the biggest in human history. Through in depth interviews analysis, and their systematization, the research proposes a classification of the challenges that journalism faces in coverage of natural disasters in four groups (emotional and psychological effects, logistical difficulties, restricted access to information, and ethical dilemmas) that divides them in specific factors and their respective intervening elements.

RESUMEN: En circunstancias en que se altera profundamente tanto la realidad social como la rutina noticiosa, la acción periodística se ve desafiada por los acontecimientos y, muchas veces, sus herramientas habituales de trabajo son sobrepasadas por las necesidades informativas de la población. Esta investigación aborda los retos y prácticas comunes que suelen darse en esas situaciones de quiebre y, en especial, los desafíos que enfrenta el periodismo durante la cobertura de desastres naturales. El trabajo se hace a partir de la experiencia en los cuatro principales canales de televisión abierta durante el terremoto del 27 de febrero de 2010 en Chile, uno de los más grandes que registra la historia. Explora sobre la base de entrevistas en profundidad a periodistas, editores y directores, la experiencia vivida durante este acontecimiento, y luego sistematiza las fortalezas y debilidades que tuvo el periodismo chileno durante este evento, que pueden ser extrapolables a otras situaciones de naturaleza similar. Finalmente, propone una clasificación de estos aspectos en cuatro desafíos (efectos emocionales y psicológicos; dificultades logísticas; acceso restringido a la información y dilemas éticos), los que divide en factores específicos y elementos intervinientes.

Keywords: Journalism, catastrophe, earthquake, challenges, television.

Palabras clave: periodismo, catástrofe, terremoto, desafíos, televisión.

1. Introduction

3:34 AM, Saturday, February 27, 2010. The South Center of Chile becomes the epicenter of an earthquake reaching 8.8 degrees Richter. In less than an hour, the Chilean coast endures a series of tsunamis that submerge large geographical areas. 527 citizens die, 35 disappear¹ and thousands lose their homes or their beloved ones. The majority of Chileans, for their organization and even their survival, rely heavily on data received through some

¹ According official data: Cfr. Subsecretaría del Interior de Chile, “Informe final de fallecidos y desaparecidos por comuna”, 31-01-2011, available on: http://www.interior.gob.cl/filesapp/listado_fallecidos_desaparecidos_27Feb.pdf

media. However, the impact also shakes the journalistic work deeply, not only expanding the margins of its action, but also jeopardizing many of its usual work routines.

This earthquake was an event that fulfilled all the criteria of news relevance², such as multiple affected on a national and international level, permanent consequences with impact on the economy, health, education, politics, etc. and put in check the reaction capacity of authorities, Special Forces, aid equipment, and the press departments in the country.

It has been 25 years since the last time that, in Chile, an opportunity like this to analyze journalism presented itself, allowing to observe how, despite being immersed in a seismic culture that permeates the various fields of everyday life³, every event of this nature is presented as a limit experience that menaces any professional routine. From the journalistic point of view, a catastrophe of this magnitude becomes one of the rare occasions in which personal and professional life are merged, as if a doctor had to operate from emergency a family member, or as if a fireman faced the fire of his own home.

This paper explores through the eyes of journalists, editors, and directors who had to work during the event, what were the challenges that they had to confront, as people and professionals, in this experience, and attempts to set parameters that can be extrapolated to other similar situations and whose knowledge allows lightening its effects. To this end it proposes a systematization of the strengths and weaknesses that Chilean journalism had during this event, and a classification of these aspects in four challenges (emotional and psychological effects, logistical difficulties, restricted access to information and ethical dilemmas).

2. Theoretical framework

The shared experience of Chileans during the crisis triggered by the earthquake focused especially on the television screen; a media whose ability to convene people is still higher than any other, especially in times of high collective stress⁴, since by definition it is

² According to the evaluation methodology of journalistic content quality *VAP-UC* (Spanish acronym for *Valor Agregado Periodístico*, Journalism Added Value) developed by a team of professors of the School of Journalism of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, the indicators for assessing the news relevance of a fact are: number of people involved, status of those involved, extent of the consequences, duration of the consequences and frequency of occurrence of the fact. Cfr. PELLEGRINI, Silvia, *et al.*, *Valor Agregado Periodístico: la apuesta por la calidad de las noticias*, Ediciones UC, Santiago, 2011.

³ Cfr. LAGOS, Marcelo, “Viviendo con terremotos y tsunamis”, document presented at *Seminario Chile: de la experiencia de terremotos y tsunamis a la cultura sísmica*, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 22-03-2011; DE LA LLERA, Juan Carlos, “Ingeniería sísmica chilena: la oportunidad en la desgracia”, document presented at *Seminario Chile: de la experiencia de terremotos y tsunamis a la cultura sísmica*, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 03-05-2011.

⁴ Cfr. CONSEJO NACIONAL DE TELEVISIÓN (CNTV), “VII Encuesta Nacional de TV”, Santiago, 2011, available on:

http://www.cntv.cl/prontus_cntv/site/artic/20110913/asocfile/20110913123632/7_entv_2011.pdf;

CONSEJO NACIONAL DE TELEVISIÓN (CNTV), “Estudio de la cobertura televisiva del terremoto: El terremoto visto a través de la pantalla y la audiencia”, Santiago, 2010, available on:

http://www.cntv.cl/prontus_cntv/site/artic/20121003/asocfile/20121003155042/terremoto_27_f_2010.pdf

present, of immediate action and its stream is continuous⁵. In the coverage of disasters, television, as well as other media supports, participates in the task of allowing a community to return to normal⁶. For example, newscasts were the primary source for the people trapped after hurricanes Katrina and Rita⁷. The media also reported to the world the destruction, the victims and the need for assistance after the tsunami in Asia in 2004⁸. The same thing happened during the attacks to the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001⁹, the bombing of the metro of Madrid on March 11, 2004¹⁰, and the attack on the London transport system on July 7, 2005¹¹.

However, despite its impact, and perhaps that is the reason why, the journalistic quality of the Chilean television coverage of the earthquake and tsunami of 2010 during the first few

⁵ Cfr. CEBRIÁN, Mariano, “La nueva frontera de los realities shows y de las estrategias multimedia”, *Palabra Clave*, n° 9, diciembre, 2003. available on: <http://palabraclave.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/palabraclave/article/view/421/559>; ARLEDGE, Roodge, *A memoir: Roone*, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 2003; NEWCOMB, Horace, *Television. The Critical View*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000; MIALL, Leonard, *Inside the BBC: British Broadcasting Characters*, Weindelfed and Nicolson, London, 1994; AULETTA, Ken, *Three Blind Mice. How the TV networks lost their way*, Random House, Nueva York, 1992.

⁶ Cfr. HINDMAN, Douglas Blanks and COYLE, Kathy, “Audience orientations to local radio coverage of a natural disaster”, *Journal of Radio & Audio Media*, vol. 6, n° 1, 1999, pp. 8-26; LOZANO ASCENCIO, Carlos, “Medios de comunicación y catástrofes: ¿tratantes de información?”, document presented at *XIX Congreso Internacional de Comunicación: La comunicación en situaciones de crisis: del 11M al 14M*, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 2004, pp. 563-574; RAMONET, Ignacio, “Aprender de Haití”, *Le Monde Diplomatique en español*, n° 172, 07-02-2010.

⁷ Cfr. LITTLEFIELD, Robert S. and QUENETTE, Andrea M., “Crisis leadership and Hurricane Katrina: The portrayal of authority by the media in natural disasters”, *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, vol. 35, n° 1, 2007, pp. 26-47; BARNES, Michael D., *et al.*, “Analysis of media agenda setting during and after Hurricane Katrina: Implications for emergency preparedness, disaster response, and disaster policy”, *American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 98, n° 4, 2008, pp. 604-610; KATES, Robert W., *et al.*, “Reconstruction of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: A research perspective”, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS*, vol. 103, n° 40, 2006, pp. 14.653-14.660; MALHOTRA, Neil and KUO, Alexander, “How Perceptions of Government Failure Shape Attitudes on Federalism and Party Trust: The Case of Hurricane Katrina and Natural Disaster Management”, document presented at the annual meeting of the *Southern Political Science Association*, New Orleans, 07-05-2013; ZAWAHRI, Neda, “Natural Disaster and National Security - Hurricane Katrina and the Collapse of Governance in New Orleans”, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, 28-02-2007.

⁸ Cfr. MORGAN, Oliver W., *et al.*, “Mass Fatality Management following the South Asian Tsunami Disaster: Case Studies in Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka”, *PLoS Med*, vol. 3, n° 6, 2006, available on: <http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030195>

⁹ Cfr. ZELIZER, Barbie and ALLAN, Stuart, *Journalism after September 11*, Routledge, New York, 2004.

¹⁰ Cfr. CROVI, Delia and LOZANO, Carlos, “Calidad frente a incertidumbre: miedos y riesgos por ver la televisión”, *Comunicar*, vol. 025, n° 2, 2005, pp. 322-323; MORALES-MARENTE, Elena and MOYA, Miguel, “Reacciones psico-políticas ante los ataques terroristas del 11 de Marzo de 2004”, *Revista de Psicología Social*, vol. 20, n° 3, 2005, pp. 331-350.

¹¹ Cfr. LOWREY, Wilson, *et al.*, “Effective media communication of disasters: Pressing problems and recommendations”, *BMC Public Health*, 7, 2007, p. 97, available on: <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/97>; OST, James, *et al.*, “Familiarity breeds distortion: The effects of media exposure on false reports concerning media coverage of the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005”, *Memory*, vol. 16, n° 1, 2008, pp. 76-85.

days was harshly questioned by the audience¹², by the authorities and by the media¹³, especially for the way in which it faced the pain of the victims, for having triggered in viewers worry and excessive sadness, and because it would have left engraved in their memories images of destruction, devastation, suffering and looting.

The criticisms made in the Chilean case, however, are not new. International experience indicates that journalists are accused of making inaccurate, incomplete, and sensationalist coverage that can contribute to the audience to misunderstand the delivered information¹⁴. The logic of catastrophes as unforeseen, sudden, dangerous and unexplained events¹⁵, often triggers a descriptive coverage, in which instead of gathering the facts with their causes and consequences, preference is given to metaphors and images, there is a tendency to reinforce stereotypes¹⁶ and to offer firstly information about pain¹⁷.

These deficiencies detected in the journalistic work seem to be especially relevant in a context in which audiences are in a state of shock, which would lead them to blur the boundaries between news and crisis. In this context, they would face television in the hope that this gives them information to get things in order and to stabilize¹⁸. Hence the importance of critical approaches, as the one of Bernardo and Pelliser¹⁹, on “media naturalization” of disasters and what they call “communicative responsibility”.

The Chilean case matches what has been described by literature. Disasters produce, on one hand, need for access to information of all kinds and, on the other, they damage the correct flow of information required from these informational needs, due to the prevailing precariousness²⁰. The work of journalists during catastrophes is always torn between professional attitudes and a series of new dilemmas resulting of the own catastrophe, affecting the professional action.

The analysis of literature distinguishes four different types of challenges: Emotional, logistical, strictly informational and ethical.

¹² Cfr. CONSEJO NACIONAL DE TELEVISIÓN (CNTV), Estudio de la cobertura televisiva..., *op. cit.*; SOUZA, María Dolores and MARTÍNEZ, Víctor, “La intervención de la televisión en el terremoto chileno”, *Comunicar*, n° 36, vol. XVIII, 2011, pp. 69-76.

¹³ Cfr. CONSEJO DE ÉTICA DE LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN, (CEM), *Resolución n° 151: Cobertura de noticias en situación de catástrofe*, Santiago, 27-04-2010, available on: <http://www.observatoriofucatel.cl/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Cobertura-en-situaci%C3%B3n-de-cat%C3%A1strofe.pdf>

¹⁴ Cfr. LOWREY, Wilson, *et al.*, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ Cfr. LOZANO ASCENCIO, Carlos, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ Cfr. OYANEDEL, Regina and ALARCÓN, Claudia, “Una Mirada al tratamiento televisivo de la catástrofe”, *Cuadernos de Información*, n° 26, 2010, pp. 115-122.

¹⁷ Cfr. NOGUERA VIVO, José Manuel, “El framing en la cobertura periodística de la catástrofe: las víctimas, los culpables y el dolor”, *Sphera pública*, vol. 006, 2006, pp. 193-206.

¹⁸ Cfr. DOANE, Mary Ann, “Information, Crisis, Catastrophe”, in MELLENCAMP, Patricia (ed.), *Logics of Television*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1990, pp. 222-239; BENJAMIN, Walter, *Discursos Interrumpidos I*, Taurus, Buenos Aires, 1989.

¹⁹ Cfr. BERNARDO, José María and PELLISER, Nello, “La ‘naturalización’ mediática de las catástrofes. Una aproximación crítica”, *Cuadernos de información*, n° 26, 2010, pp. 103-114.

²⁰ Cfr. LITTLEFIELD, Robert S. and QUENETTE, Andrea M., *op. cit.*; LOZANO ASCENCIO, Carlos, *op. cit.*; CROVI, Delia and LOZANO, Carlos, *op. cit.*

The emotional challenges are based on journalists not only acting as professional witnesses of traumatic events –as the case of war correspondents²¹– but also being, to a greater or lesser extent, victims of the tragedy. This is why the states of anxiety, stress, chaos or emergency are not only experienced by testimonial sources²² but also by journalists, who must perform their work trying to set aside personal situations of high emotional impact²³, without necessarily having psychological structures more prepared to be periodically exposed to disaster situations²⁴.

The logistical challenges arise when the disaster is of large proportions, because the journalist can face communication and connectivity problems to reach the place of the news, difficulties in lodging when the tragedy extends to several days or even live in danger of exposure to disease or lack of food in areas of extreme precariousness²⁵.

The information challenges derive from journalists having to face their social responsibility of informing²⁶ in a context marked by uncertainty²⁷ and that necessarily entails problems of coverage ranging from improvisation and lack of accuracy²⁸ to how to deal with journalistic objectivity²⁹. In this aspect the Dart Center for Journalism and Trauma, of the Columbia University, explains that the interaction with people in a state of shock or stressed by the event may complicate the collection of reliable data and therefore, the informative work³⁰. According to the Chilean Media Ethics Council³¹, professional principles that are evident in situations of normality as making “the informational role prevails over solidarity, care or judgments (...) tend to lose their accuracy during catastrophes”.

And finally, the ethical challenges lie in journalists debating constantly between the need to inform, the eventual transgression of the private rights of those affected and the urge to participate in the relief and rescue work. They are not always able to discern if a certain

²¹ Cfr. HIMMELSTEIN, Hal and FAITHORN, E. Perry, “Eyewitness to disaster: how journalists cope with the psychological stress inherent in reporting traumatic events”, *Journalism Studies*, vol. 3, n° 4, 2010, pp. 537-555.

²² According to the VAP-UC methodology, testimonial sources are people consulted under their direct relation with the news fact, opining in a personal way. PELLEGRINI, Silvia, *et al.*, *op. cit.*

²³ Cfr. POTTER, Deborah y RICCHIARDI, Sherry, *Cobertura de desastres y crisis*, International Center for Journalists, Washington, 2006; COLÓN, Aly, “Trauma Takes Toll on Journalists Covering Disasters”, *Poynter Institute*, 02-03-2011; ZELIZER, Barbie y ALLAN, Stuart, *op. cit.*

²⁴ Cfr. HIMMELSTEIN, Hal and FAITHORN, E. Perry, *op. cit.*; FREEDY, John R., *et al.*, “Understanding acute psychological distress following natural disaster”, *Journal of Traumatic Stress*, vol. 7, n° 2, 1994, pp. 257-273.

²⁵ Cfr: NOGUERA VIVO, José Manuel, *Informar emociones: el lenguaje periodístico en la cobertura de catástrofes*, LibrosEnRed, Edición digital, 2005; POTTER, Deborah and RICCHIARDI, Sherry, *op. cit.*

²⁶ Cfr. BURKHART, Ford N., “Journalists as bureaucrats: perceptions of ‘social responsibility’ media roles in local emergency planning”, *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, vol. 9, n° 1, 1991, pp. 75-87.

²⁷ Cfr. CROVI, Delia y LOZANO, Carlos, *op. cit.*

²⁸ Cfr. BRUSI, D., ALFARO, P. and GONZÁLEZ, M., “Los riesgos geológicos en los medios de comunicación: el tratamiento informativo de las catástrofes naturales como recurso didáctico”, *Enseñanza de las Ciencias de la Tierra*, vol. 16, n° 2, 2008, pp. 154-166.

²⁹ Cfr. NOGUERA VIVO, *op. cit.*

³⁰ Cfr. HIGHT, Joe and SMYTH, Frank (eds.), *Tragedies and journalists: a guide for more effective coverage*, Dart Center for Journalism and Trauma, 2003, available on: http://dartcenter.org/files/en_tnj_0.pdf

³¹ CONSEJO DE ÉTICA DE LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN, (CEM), *op. cit.*, p. 1.

description invades the ground of inadmissibility or, on the contrary, provides relevant traits that allow clarifying the causes of the difficult situations that they are narrating³².

3. Proposal

For this analysis, the research team³³ developed the following operational definition:

Informative coverage of disasters is what news departments (in this case, television) carry out when reporting on phenomena of high social significance, which as a result of their magnitude break down the role of institutions, interfere with journalistic routines, and force professionals to work under intense pressure, uncertainty, and personal and social vulnerability.

The challenges derived from the theoretical analysis cause a series of vulnerability moments of the professional work, expressed in the following four groups:

1. Addressing the emotional and psychological effects triggered by the trauma of others and journalists' stress.
2. Addressing the logistical difficulties and scarcities associated with work in the newsroom and on field coverage.
3. Overcoming restricted access to data and reliable sources that contradicts with the permanent need to deliver information to the population.
4. Respecting the ethical constraints that are amplified by the context of tragedy.

The objective of this paper is to explore how journalists, editors and directors of Chilean television declared to have faced these challenges during the first hours of coverage and broadcast following the earthquake of February 27, 2010. The results would serve as a basis to establish, in a later work, a protocol that allows alleviating the informational difficulties that arise in these circumstances.

4. Methodology

To achieve the objective described above were conducted a series of 20 in-depth semi-structured interviews to journalists, editors and press directors who worked during the hours of broadcast following the earthquake in the four main channels of broadcast television from Chile:

- *Canal 13*: Private channel³⁴.

³² Cfr. LOZANO ASCENCIO, Carlos, *op. cit.*; CHOULIARAKI, Lillie, "Ordinary witnessing in post-television news: towards a new moral imagination", *Critical discourse studies*, vol. 7, n° 4, 2010, pp. 305-319; YEZ, Lyuba, "Desafíos éticos de la cobertura televisiva de un hecho traumático", *Cuadernos.Info*, n° 32, junio 2013, pp. 39-46.

³³ This work is part of the results of the first year of implementation of the Fondecyt project n° 1110363 "Elaboración de un modelo de acción periodística profesional para televisión en periodos de catástrofe, a partir del análisis de la cobertura hecha por los canales nacionales para el terremoto del 27 de febrero de 2010".

- *Chilevisión*: Private channel.
- *Mega*: Private channel.
- *TVN*: Public channel, self-financed.

Specifically the interviewees were:

- Sixteen journalists: Four of each channel.
- Two editors: One of the public channel and one of a private channel.
- Two media directors: One of the public channel and one of a private channel.

There were two questionnaires of open response, one for journalists (of 21 questions), and one for editors and directors (of 27 questions), applied in face-to-face interviews conducted between the months of April and December 2011.

These interviews were analyzed from the theoretical framework proposed earlier, in order to infer from them the main factors present in those challenges, all of which were catalogued and ordered to constitute a table that breaks them down into the various factors distinguishable in each of them, and the precise elements with which the interviewees characterize them³⁵.

5. Results

Below were summarized the main answers extracted from the in-depth interviews³⁶, which contributed with items selected for their importance to illustrate each of the theoretical challenges.

5.1. Challenge 1: Addressing the emotional and psychological effects triggered by the trauma of others and journalists' stress

Although journalists tend to insist on their ability to distance themselves from the events they cover, in this case many of them were not able to separate their personal experience of trauma from the facts they were covering, and especially those who had direct ties with the most affected places. To this condition, that might be called self-referential factor, was added, in some cases, a dissociation factor related to the need to make an effort to void their emotions and feelings in those moments, in order to carry out to their professional work. In those cases they were forced to make an extra effort that caused them emotional problems later.

³⁴ At that time it belonged entirely to the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and shared its social mission. Today the university participates only in 33% of the property, and the major shareholder, as well as the administration of the media, is in the hands of a private entrepreneur.

³⁵ For purposes of order and better understanding of the texts, the factors of each challenge were used to order the selected paragraphs of the interviews, and marked in bold are the more remarkable element of each paragraph, according to the researchers.

³⁶ The Chilean slang of the answers was slightly modified through synonyms of cult language for better understanding, and without altering its meaning whatsoever.

Regardless of the type and quantity of previous experiences that journalists had covering disasters, this event was for the interviewees the most shocking one in emotional terms, due probably to the factors of identification and belonging that they experienced by having direct contact with the pain of people who could have been their loved ones.

Journalists explicitly recognize aspects of very primary personal interests, of person-profession dilemma and of the personal value of the experience.

5.1.1. *Self-referential factor: Journalists subordinate the informational needs to their personal interests*

The first editorial challenge **was disobeying my editors** (they sent him to Constitución³⁷ and he decided to go to Concepción, his city of origin³⁸), but the second was to see the city where you were born, raised and spent much of your life, destroyed, on the floor (Journalist, *Mega*).

When they tell you that you have to **separate feelings from the coverage, it is impossible**. Because I am human, no matter what. I am a journalist, but I also have my feelings, and I cannot get them out of me and set them aside (Journalist, *Canal 13*).

We (on field journalists) had to report (to the channel) the physical and emotional state of the team. Personally, I emphasized that. **The dilemma of some colleagues who also were mothers especially worried me. Fulfilling their work, they felt that they were betraying their duty towards their children** (Journalist, *TVN*).

5.1.2. *Dissociation factor: Journalists force themselves to relegate their emotions to prioritize their professional conduct*

You have to create a **gigantic shield** (...). I had no major problem there (at the scene). (Then), they gave me four days to rest, which I slept fully. (...) When I went back to work, they asked me to make a note of the earthquake, and when I started seeing images that I had not seen and hearing the sound of the earthquake, there **I broke, the anxiety, the panic attacks, all fell on me**. Not back there, there **I managed to block myself**, which is what is required from journalists (Journalist, *TVN*).

(In emotional terms it was) tremendous, tremendous. For me, what **I lived there was really strong**, the state in which houses were left (...), the boats in the middle of sidewalks (...). **It was an experience that I am grateful to have lived**, but it was very hard to see people who lost all the effort of their life (Journalist, *CHV*).

³⁷ Seaside city of the El Maule Region, destroyed by the tsunami.

³⁸ Capital of the Bío-Bío Region, one of the most affected.

5.1.3. *Identification and belonging factors: Journalists assume as their own the pain of others and feel part of the positive and negative actions of other participants*

In Haiti you walked through the streets of Port-au-Prince and there were dead people every half meter. People buried bodies in the street because the atmosphere was suffocating, but even so, a strong image like that did not affect me as much as Chile. Basically because you see your city, **people you feel like family**, your compatriots very affected (Journalist, *CHV*).

(What struck me the most was) the opportunism, the looting and depredation of neighbor against neighbor. (...) It **hurt me a lot** that international colleagues told me how impressed they were with the level of hidden violence that Chile had (Journalist, *TVN*).

5.2. *Challenge 2: Addressing the logistical difficulties and shortages associated with work in the newsroom and on field coverage*

Attend the workplace immediately after a catastrophic event is a professional standard shared in Chilean TV channels. Journalists, editors and directors know that when facing any disaster, they must go immediately to the channel and wait for instructions. However, from there onwards it seems that decisions are mostly taken at the moment. In this case, the emergency is faced in a context marked by urgency, scarcity and defenselessness, which affects the professional action.

The experience also shows lack of foresight for emergencies, which resulted in channels living the earthquake with a clear shortage of technical, material and human resources, in an environment of lack of anticipation and no prior distribution of tasks.

These elements were corrected little by little with wit and goodwill of the first who arrived to the channels, which assumed different roles from the usual, used their own vehicles to cover the news and move, etc. These elements can be synthesized in the presence of improvisation factors, lack of resources and personal insecurity.

5.2.1. *Improvisation factor: Journalists employ personal initiatives to overcome the emergency*

We all know that at big emergency situations we have to arrive to the channel, run to the channel. The cameraman was actually at a party nearby, and did the same thing that I did. **We got to the point where we had to break the bars where the equipment was saved and start to get cameras, because they were going to be other journalists arriving to go out and cover the event** (...). The truth is that these are implicit, and not explicit, plans (Journalist, *CHV*).

It was pure intuition and experience. (...) We arrived to some places before the military, before support, **because we had the ability as a team to solve how to get there.** In a moment I am informed: 'This is as far as we arrive. We cannot continue by car' (...) and we

sent to two motorbikes with a cameraman and a journalist, who arrived to places inside where they discovered things we never thought to see. And those images (...) were historic because there people began to measure the tragedy (Press director, public channel).

They call me from the channel (...) and tell me 'come, because you are going to go to the airport to hitchhike'. **That meant going to stand at the airport expecting someone to pity me and take me to some point in Chile where something was happening.** The first that took pity of me, after about five hours, were from FACH³⁹, and took me to Concepción. When we arrived there, Concepción was like "under siege" (Journalist, *Mega*).

We had "the piece of paper method", as in the 80's television. Between writing, printing and delivering, it was better to say (to the anchorman/woman) 'this intensity in Mercural scale in this region, or there is no light on that place'. They made me a gesture and I took (the anchorwoman) out of screen, passed her the paper discreetly, and she read it. Because a prompter or those technologies, not a chance! **Such was the flow of information, that paper and pencil was the most useful method** (Journalist, *TVN*).

We started with the only thing that concerned us: the batteries, the cables, take the memory cards and being able to transmit on the ground to the channel. For us, we had some water bottles, toilet paper and me, and the entire team, was complicated that we were already going with the truck with little gasoline. (...) Way on the road, we approached a gas station where there was a queue of kilometers. And there I said 'no, even if people want to lynch us, we will go first', and **I got off and said 'I'm sorry, but we are going in press coverage'**. And people behaved very well (Journalist, *Canal 13*).

5.2.2. Dearth factor: Journalists have no access to the operative elements necessary to carry out their work

If the earthquake was at 3.34 AM, I was at the channel at 3.50. (...) People who lived alone arrived first. At that time we knew nothing yet. (...) **We had no mobile units to be operational.** Communications were cut, so we could not call or know what was happening. We did not know anything! (Editor, public channel).

The first difficulty was that **cameras were not available at a 100%**. Secondly, being a Saturday at three thirty-four in the morning, **there were no cars**. To reach the ONEMI⁴⁰ we had to go hitchhiking. Third, communications also failed, **because we worked at that time with mobile phones and they did not work** (Journalist, *CHV*).

There was a small (contingency) plan, but it proved out to be extremely poor. **There were many journalists and few cameramen at the time.** The cameramen left immediately to regions, because we sensed that the situation was more serious there. And I kept covering alone, with a camera and a microphone, (in my car) and seeing that the fuel was nearing zero (Journalist, *CHV*).

³⁹ Air Force of Chile.

⁴⁰ National Emergency Office.

I had never been in a war (...), but (a correspondent with experience) was with us and said that it was very similar to when you entered into a bombed-out city. (...) We had travel problems because there was no fuel. **We could not obtain gasoline, because the gas stations work with light, and as there was no light...** there were some that worked manually, but began to control the gasoline, a certain amount per car (Editor, public channel).

We travelled with a camera, a microphone and nothing else. **As we edited the notes there, we got a computer a week and a half later** (Journalist, *CHV*).

5.2.3. *Personal scarcity factor: Journalists must perform their functions with very restricted life conditions*

I have worked in several earthquakes, several catastrophes, but never had so many difficulties to work like in this one. There was no place to stay, there was no light, there was no water, no gas. We were there **six days without being able to shower. Without brushing our teeth** because there was nowhere to buy a toothbrush. **We all went out with what we had on**, we did not take our stuff, we had nowhere to eat. (...) **The first seven days were of absolute dirt and discomfort** (Journalist, *Mega*).

And that night I spent it at the airport, in a cot of campaign, me and the cameraman... When we got up in the morning, **we went out to "hose ourselves" (shower with a hose) with cold water in the landing platform** (Journalist, *Mega*).

When a week had passed we got a motor home for four people, where twelve slept (Journalist, *CHV*).

There was so much despair that I remember having taken **two boxes with cookies and juice**. Those boxes disappeared at the airport (Journalist, *Mega*).

5.3. *Challenge 3: Overcoming restricted access to data and reliable sources that contradicts with the permanent need to deliver information to the population*

Most of the decisions in the first hours after the earthquake were taken based on the intuition of journalists, editors and directors due mainly to communication problems, lack of knowledge of the magnitude of the events and the uncertainty prompted by the lack of information from official sources. Journalistic work was conditioned, first of all, by a factor of general unawareness and secondly by a factor of failure, ineffectiveness or lack of sources.

The third factor involved in this challenge had to do with the search of a priority closeness focus at the moment of telling the stories. Direct sources, particularly testimonials, were preferred by all television channels since many times they had information unknown by official sources, and due to the emotional charge that their stories could transmit. Although often channels chose such sources because of their availability, also in several cases there

was an editorial decision to give them space on screen as a way of involving all Chileans into the situation of the most remote places, deliver public interest information, draw the attention of the authorities and ask for calm.

Fourthly, because of the distance, the difficulties of communication, lack of time and the uninterrupted flow of news and transmission, journalists had to face a modification of the traditional relationship with their editors. Often elements of the editor role were delegated to journalists on the field, who faced the need to assume their tasks based on intuition and empowerment. In addition, this experience meant for editors to test their ability to contain their subordinates emotionally and combine that with their journalistic decision-making skills, as well as adapting their leadership skills, and exercising their role depending mainly on the information of the same journalists.

5.3.1. *Factor of general unawareness: Nor authorities, population, or the media have a clear idea of what happened*

There was very little information, and the information that we had was through the authorities, who also had little information, which was **very scarce and limited**. (...) That did not allow us to be able to make or not a call to calm the population, for example, in a situation of possible tsunami, because we had no information that it was happening (Journalist, *Canal 13*).

When you do not have much information, **the first thing is to certify the rumors**, which is almost obvious and there is (no) need to say so (Editor, private channel).

The first images do not represent at all what may be the real magnitude of the social drama created by a situation of this nature. All channels that day, at least until the sunrise, dedicated to mainly show the road that goes to the airport (...) and the tower of the church of Divina Providencia⁴¹, which had fallen to the street. **But we did not know the magnitude or were able to transmit it, because of the extension it had. (...) About the tsunami, we learned next day. Even the authorities did not have a clear awareness of the effects of the cataclysm.** We dedicated to show the destruction, the affected regions, but there was no immediate communication with regard to the effects that had the tsunami in the population of the regions (Press director, private channel).

5.3.2. *Factor of failure, ineffectiveness or lack of sources: Persons officially in charge of facing the emergency do not have reliable data to deliver*

At ONEMI there was a lot of bewilderment, there was no clear information, nobody talked about tsunami (...). We could not serve as a warning because no one alerted us (Press director, public channel).

⁴¹ The church is located in the main avenue of the capital of Chile, Santiago.

We tried to **talk to the Mayor, who did not appear anywhere. He had communication problems and it was hard to find him in media terms.** He did not talk much either, because his actions at the time that the disaster unleashed were being questioned. (...) **The authority was so little, and so little what they could say, other than complaining** (Journalist, *Mega*).

Every day **we had to make our agenda according to the experience of people** who knew the region very well (...). We informed of a tsunami and Government authorities told us 'no, there is no tsunami'. After, that (direct) information was corroborated by facts (Editor, public channel).

5.3.3. *Factor of priority closeness focus (service): Journalists base their stories on the testimonial and the public interest information to keep the audience's attention*

It (...) was an informative avalanche of 24 hours that did not stop for a week. (...) What new can you find when you already have so many days and many hours showing, showing, showing? **And I think that the answer to that was to find human stories of people who had managed to survive or who were suffering a drama.** That was the challenge that I was given here, **look for new stories**, tell the story of the earthquake, but from a new perspective (Journalist, *CHV*).

People were (privileged as a source) because official sources were a bit disoriented, particularly the first days. (...) Then we **chose the testimonial, showing what was happening. The images spoke for themselves**, the human cases, the authorities, when it was appropriate (Editor, TVN).

Beyond formality, the structure of the note or the official sources there may have been, **we were interested in making the persons who sees the news feel that something like that can also happen to them**, that way the news they are viewing feels closer (Journalist, *CHV*).

We resort a lot to people linked to **the business world (to give) public interest information** of to the community. (...) The **authorities approached us and told us that they wanted to convey messages** (...). We did it, **because we had to help people**, (...) we had to transmit the information fast and fluidly and repeat it many times, because that way, people could find out in television, what were the authorities doing, where could they go to seek help, when services were going to be restituted, until when the state of siege lasted, from what time to what time was the curfew, which changed with the days (Editor, public channel).

5.3.4. *Modification of the editorial relationship factor: The link editor-journalist is modified for greater autonomy of the journalist in the field*

You start making a lot of bets; for example, I sent (a journalist) to Iloca⁴² because we heard (the rumor) that the sea had aroused. Along the way, he calls me to say that

⁴² Iloca is a seaside town of the El Maule Region, destroyed by the tsunami.

apparently nothing was happening there. He had already made 75% of the trip, he had 25% left. I told him to go anyway. And he arrived and it was a disaster. **You must take operational, practical, journalistic decisions** (Editor, public channel).

It was such an informative maelstrom **that there was not much communication between the journalist and the editor** because the editor was immediately in charge of 20 journalists airing, of all. But **the few indications he gave me were very clear: 'calm, tranquility, deliver the information, do not keep anything, but show calm'** (Journalist, *CHV*).

Instructions were almost unnecessary, because they were 'go cover an earthquake'. Yes, we talked, but we do not deepen much. It is the other way around, **they give me the information, because I did not have it, I was 'blind'** (Editor, private channel).

The truth is that **in those situations you have to respect the initiative** of people. For example, we did not have communication with the team of Valparaíso, but they took the decision to travel (to the epicenter area). We congratulated them on the decision (Press director, private channel).

It was a very good experience (...) of how to self-edit. Of how to rescue what is most important, (of) how to start to create stories (...) which showed some hope. I felt that our transmission was very catastrophic (...), we had several days of coverage and I had the feeling that we were transmitting much anguish to the audience. There were also stories of hope to tell and at that moment **I called my editor and told him to let me look for different stories** (Journalist, *Canal 13*).

(My relationship with the editor) was very human. I was impressed. **He asked before sending me if I had the human capacity to go to an earthquake**, which surprises me because in this context that does not exist, publishers are very tough for their things (Journalist, *CHV*).

5.4. Challenge 4: Respecting the ethical constraints amplified by the context of tragedy

One of the most frequent ethical challenges in the coverage of disasters is to make the decision over whether to do the coverage or help the victims. In the Chilean case, journalists claim that the constant dilemma was to select cases to show on screen as a way of helping individuals to request aid in a public way. This selection meant to deal with a sort of "discrimination" between those who had and who did not have the opportunity to be on screen, as well as to assess the need for assistance of the victims who saw the TV as a possibility of response to their needs. Also, there was the need to act as support elements and even protection of third parties, for which journalists were not prepared.

While journalists, editors and directors believe that the work done was careful and respectful with the honor of people, they assume that there were moments when they were overwhelmed by the spectacular nature of certain events, especially in the case of looting at department stores and supermarkets in the Bío-Bío Region. The main self-criticism points

precisely to that, considering the lack of reflection and the excessive repetition of images as the major ethical problems of this coverage. Two factors were put in contradiction at the time: The impact of the news, which led the media to need an immediate reaction many times without measuring the consequences of the transmission, and the informational value of covered events.

None of the interviewee made reference to the violence or truculence of images or to the respect for privacy and the pain of the people, for example. A hypothesis might be that this is an area where they have clear rules and therefore it does not represent a problem for them deciding on the matter.

5.4.1. *Care factor: Journalists debate between cover information and provide assistance to those in need, and feel as part of their obligations to mitigate the pain or the responsibilities of third parties*

Personally, it affected me a lot for a double reason: Because I felt that in addition to the journalistic role, **I had to exercise a second role for which I was never prepared**, which was the supporting people. People approached me and said, 'I want to tell my story, listen to me' and there is a psychological **role of support for which I have no tools** (Journalist, *Canal 13*).

Media, in such a big drama, with deaths, missing persons, homes destroyed, along with informing **have to try helping to solve the social and human problem** taking place. It is a priority task. (...) The great lesson for journalists, in a situation of conflict like that one, is that their roles are at least two: **Inform what is happening** and also **helping the authority with the focus of conflict and citizenship to show its reality, its needs** (Press director, private channel).

More than once **I stopped covering, I left the camera down and we helped to move rubble, to move things, but our task also helped**. For example, there was no electricity, but we had our satellite equipment generator, we had power, so we plugged extension cords and people went to charge their cell phone. It was a service, an aid (Journalist, *CHV*).

The first times that I got together with people **they had requests of all kinds: That we charged their phones, that we gave them lists of missing persons**. (...) The most frustrating of all was that **they needed many things that they believed that we could give them** and the truth is we had no chance to do so. What was very complex was when they said 'I want to find such a person, living in such a place', that to us was very difficult because we did not have the physical tools to do it (Journalist, *Canal 13*).

5.4.2. *Selection factor: The journalist has to discriminate the persons requiring assistance and areas that will be covered*

A journalistic difficulty is that **many people see you as the aid, as the opportunity to be helped, the solution to their problems**; and suddenly you feel that you can also help them. In this case, everybody approached us to tell us 'hey, you know that we have no light', 'hey,

you know that, we have no water', 'you know what, we need this'(...) and that was difficult because it was so much information that we could not say everything (Journalist, *CHV*).

Regarding coverage, I think that perhaps **the only thing which we could have missed (...)** **was being able to be everywhere** where people required our presence. But unfortunately we are thirty journalists and thirty journalists cannot be all over Chile. That is why **the most emblematic cities were chosen, with more destruction, with more problems**. But I know that there were many people who needed our help, who called us and told us, 'hey, please, come to this place, come here that we are suffering' and we could not go there. Perhaps **this feeling of not being able to be everywhere leaves you a little distressed**, but unfortunately it could not be that way (Journalist, *Mega*).

5.4.3. *Assignment of informative value factor: The journalist decides the priority focus that he will give to the information*

Perhaps we were transmitting the looting⁴³ live for a long time. But it was the news of the moment. **The image was really shocking**, and it was inevitable that it became the center of attention. Seen at a distance you can analyze how it could have been done better, but when you are live, and things are happening with that urgency, there is no other alternative but to transmit the news (Journalist, *CHV*).

I think we get a little crazy about information delivery and unfortunately this business operates on the basis of rating, and that suddenly blinds us. So, **instead of delivering more and better information, one delivers immediacy**. Yes, there are minutes which require immediacy, but in others you can dig a little deeper, look for new stories (Journalist, *CHV*).

There is **some level of social responsibility**, so that one, having the opportunity on the field, not only has to tell what is happening. I remember that at the airport we were watching a certain channel, while we were waiting, and saw the story and it was like watching a television show. All the looting. But **no one said: Stop this!** No one said that the people were defenseless, and it was very necessary! (Journalist, *Mega*).

I think that the most dramatic moment of the coverage was when (...) people began with the looting, which was a terrible image. (...) I think that **portrays a terrible moment of the human being**, between fear, need, an unleashed thing that was very impressive (Press director, *TVN*).

Considering the factors and elements detected and expressed by the actors themselves and complemented with those identified by literature, we developed the following table.

⁴³ During the morning of February 28, the city of Concepción suffered a number of looting to supermarkets and shops, performed by victims of the earthquake.

Table 1: Challenges, intervening factors and specific elements involved in the journalistic work during disasters

| Challenges | Factor intervening in the challenges | Elements: Specific aspects of each factor (marked with bold in extracts of the interviews). |
|---|--|--|
| Addressing the emotional and psychological effects triggered by the trauma of others and journalists' stress | Self-referential factor: Journalists subordinate the informational needs to their personal interests | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Disobedience in pro of their own interests ▪ Assessment of personal feelings ▪ Person - profession dilemma |
| | Dissociation factor: Journalists force themselves to relegate their emotions to prioritize their professional conduct | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Creation of a shield and subsequent emotional breakdown ▪ Assessment of professional experience |
| | Identification and belonging factors: Journalists assume as their own the pain of others and feel part of the positive and negative actions of other participants | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Proximity and empathy with victims ▪ Empathy (pride or shame) with the conduct of third parties who they see as pairs |
| Addressing the logistical difficulties and shortages associated with work in the newsroom and on field coverage | Improvisation factor: Journalists employ personal initiatives to overcome the emergency | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overcome obstacles ▪ Rely on experience and intuition ▪ Get help from third parties ▪ Find alternative methods ▪ Ask for priorities |
| | Dearth factor: Journalists have no access to the operative elements necessary to carry out their work | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Travelling difficulties ▪ Lack of technical resources ▪ Staff shortages ▪ Non availability of public services and communications ▪ Difficulty of post-production |
| | Personal scarcity factor: Journalists must perform their functions with very restricted life conditions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Hygienic difficulties ▪ Difficulty in accommodation ▪ Feeding problems |
| Overcoming restricted access to data and reliable sources that contradicts with the permanent need to deliver information to the population | Factor of general unawareness: Nor authorities, population, or the media have a clear idea of what happened | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Scant and limited information ▪ Certification of rumors ▪ Difficulty to measure the magnitude of the problem |
| | Factor of failure, ineffectiveness or lack of sources: Persons officially in charge of facing the emergency do not have reliable data to deliver | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bewilderment of responsible ▪ Silence from the official sources ▪ Need to compare information with non official sources |
| | Factor of priority closeness focus (service): Journalists base their stories on the testimonial and the public interest information to keep the audience's attention | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Privileging human stories as new topics ▪ Let the images speak for themselves ▪ Promote identification ▪ Service information |

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| | Modification of the editorial relationship factor: The link editor–journalist is modified for greater autonomy of the journalist in the field | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quick decisions and accurate instructions ▪ Delegation of tasks ▪ Editorial guideline, but only general instructions ▪ Respect for initiatives ▪ Experience in self-editing ▪ Support |
| Respecting the ethical constraints that are amplified by the context of tragedy | Care factor: Journalists debate between cover information and provide assistance to those in need, and feel as part of their obligations to mitigate the pain or the responsibilities of third parties | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Emotional support to third parties. ▪ Solve the human and social problem. ▪ Direct assistance ▪ Responding to various requests. |
| | Selection factor: The journalist has to discriminate the persons requiring assistance and areas that will be covered | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Prioritization for on screen appearances ▪ Limited geographic coverage |
| | Assignment of informative value factor: The journalist decides the priority focus that he will give to the information | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Impact of images ▪ Prioritization of immediacy ▪ Social responsibility ▪ Dramatic human moments |

6. Conclusions

The first conclusion of this work that stands out is the fact that media coverage produced during the first hours following the earthquake of February 27, 2010 in Chile was marked by elements of uncertainty and insufficient elaboration, due mainly to the absence of an action protocol for cases like these. This lack hindered professional aspects (roles are blurred, the instructions are feeble, the “decision at the moment” becomes a pattern of action) and logistics (failing vehicles, accommodation, basic hygiene and food for journalists).

Despite the high degree of improvisation shown by the Chilean press departments, there is an obvious existence of a strongly assimilated professional culture that demands and obtains from journalists their immediate assistance to the media as an operations center, with the disposition to carry out the most diverse tasks and in almost any working condition.

Although journalists are aware that, unlike what happens with the rest of the population, their profession requires exposure to extreme situations (both by its tragic content as for the conditions in which they have to do their job), the reported experience on this particular disaster shows an additional difficulty for Chilean journalists: they were communicators and affected at the same time. Probably one of the most significant aspects of their analysis is the tension between the professional obligation of informing and the drive towards direct aid actions that are reinforced under the influence of the proximity factor. Also, aspects of various psychological and emotional effects are reported, which show that journalists are

not necessarily prepared to effectively deal with these extreme situations, or to accomplish that they do not affect the quality of their professional work. This is what has been considered as challenge 1: To face the emotional and psychological effects triggered by third parties' trauma of and of journalists stress.

The analyzed testimonies also reveal that catastrophes are moments in which the abilities of directors, editors and journalists are tested, even to the limit: Extremely difficult decisions are taken, there are minimal resources –often inadequate– to work, and the bet is to cover stories relying on intuition and experience and under very precarious personal conditions. This has been called challenge 2. To address the logistical difficulties and shortages associated to the work in the newsroom and on ground coverage.

Also, the ability to recognize the relevance of the most diverse sources is tested, hard informational data must be searched in a context of abundant emotions, and work must be done with an agenda impossible to foresee, occurring minute by minute, generating the need to make a decision after another, of stories whose origin and veracity is unknown.

An important element that emerges from the study is the weakness demonstrated by sources, in particular, the experts and the official ones, to deliver timely and accurate, information which results in a preponderance of rumors and the use of direct sources for information. In this case priority is given to testimonial sources, especially the more emotional ones, which transform the individual cases in the universal trend of the situation. In addition, in a context like that one, confidence of editors towards journalists requires to grow immensely, as they become many times the only ones capable of validating the information. The analysis also indicates the existence of significant changes in the direct professional action and in the one of the editors, as aspects of independence, reliability, and intuition, for example, become part of the action. This has been called challenge 3. To overcome restricted access to data and reliable sources as opposed to the continued need to inform.

Professionals are widely aware of the relevance it has for citizens that channels “are live”, which sometimes is even more important than the content itself, since the TV becomes a tool of emotional stabilization. This can mean, at times, giving priority to some people or geographic areas over others. Also indirect coverage difficult assessing the informational values of a story, since the journalist has to choose at the moment the priority focus that he will give to the information. In those cases, usually immediacy is prioritized, as well as the impact of images and dramatic human moments, which perpetuates the initial state of anguish. This has been called challenge 4. To respect the ethical constraints amplified by the context of tragedy.

The analysis of the in-depth interviews also allows a theoretical element of significance: The precision and systematization in factors and elements of the recurrent challenges. This diagnosis is the first stage of a study that seeks to develop a protocol for journalistic action to adequately face a disaster information and which addresses their full cycle, which includes preparation, response, mitigation and recovery.

References

- ARLEDGE, Roodge, *A memoir: Roone*, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 2003.
- AULETTA, Ken, *Three Blind Mice. How the TV networks lost their way*, Random House, Nueva York, 1992.
- BARNES, Michael D., et al., "Analysis of media agenda setting during and after Hurricane Katrina: Implications for emergency preparedness, disaster response, and disaster policy", *American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 98, n° 4, 2008, pp. 604-610.
- BENJAMIN, Walter, *Discursos Interrumpidos I*, Taurus, Buenos Aires, 1989.
- BERNARDO, José María and PELLISER, Nello, "La 'naturalización' mediática de las catástrofes. Una aproximación crítica", *Cuadernos de información*, n° 26, 2010, pp. 103-114.
- BRUSI, D., ALFARO, P. and GONZÁLEZ, M., "Los riesgos geológicos en los medios de comunicación: el tratamiento informativo de las catástrofes naturales como recurso didáctico", *Enseñanza de las Ciencias de la Tierra*, vol.16, n° 2, 2008, pp. 154-166.
- BURKHART, Ford N., "Journalists as bureaucrats: perceptions of 'social responsibility' media roles in local emergency planning", *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, vol. 9, n° 1, 1991, pp. 75-87.
- CEBRIÁN, Mariano, "La nueva frontera de los realities shows y de las estrategias multimedia", *Palabra Clave*, n° 9, diciembre, 2003, available on: <http://palabraclave.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/palabraclave/article/view/421/559>
- CHOULIARAKI, Lilie, "Ordinary witnessing in post-television news: towards a new moral imagination", *Critical discourse studies*, vol. 7, n° 4, 2010, pp. 305-319.
- COLÓN, Aly, "Trauma Takes Toll on Journalists Covering Disasters", *Poynter Institute*, 02-03-2011, available on: <http://www.poynter.org/how-tos/newsgathering-storytelling/diversity-at-work/29523/trauma-takes-toll-on-journalists-covering-disasters/>
- CONSEJO DE ÉTICA DE LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN (CEM), *Resolución n° 151: Cobertura de noticias en situación de catástrofe*, Santiago, 27-04-2010, available on: <http://www.observatoriofucatel.cl/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Cobertura-en-situaci%C3%B3n-de-cat%C3%A1strofe.pdf>
- CONSEJO NACIONAL DE TELEVISIÓN (CNTV), "VII Encuesta Nacional de TV", Santiago, 2011, available on: http://www.cntv.cl/prontus_cntv/site/artic/20110913/asocfile/20110913123632/7_entv_2011.pdf
- CONSEJO NACIONAL DE TELEVISIÓN (CNTV), *Estudio de la cobertura televisiva del terremoto: El terremoto visto a través de la pantalla y la audiencia*, Santiago, 2010, available on: http://www.cntv.cl/prontus_cntv/site/artic/20121003/asocfile/20121003155042/terremoto_27_f_2010.pdf
- CROVI, Delia and LOZANO, Carlos, "Calidad frente a incertidumbre: miedos y riesgos por ver la televisión", *Comunicar*, vol. 025, n° 2, 2005, pp. 322-323.
- DE LA LLERA, Juan Carlos, "Ingeniería sísmica chilena: la oportunidad en la desgracia", document presented at *Seminario Chile: de la experiencia de terremotos y tsunamis a la cultura sísmica*, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 03-05-2011.
- DOANE, Mary Ann, "Information, Crisis, Catastrophe", in MELLENCAMP, Patricia (ed.), *Logics of Television*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1990, pp. 222-239.
- FREEDY, John R., et al., "Understanding acute psychological distress following natural disaster", *Journal of Traumatic Stress*, vol. 7, n° 2, 1994, pp. 257-273.
- HIGHT, Joe y SMYTH, Frank (eds.), *Tragedies and journalists: a guide for more effective coverage*, Dart Center for Journalism and Trauma, 2003, available on:

- http://dartcenter.org/files/en_tnj_0.pdf
- HIMMELSTEIN, Hal and FAITHORN, E. Perry, “Eyewitness to disaster: how journalists cope with the psychological stress inherent in reporting traumatic events”, *Journalism Studies*, vol. 3, n° 4, 2010, pp. 537-555.
- HINDMAN, Douglas Blanks and COYLE, Kathy, “Audience orientations to local radio coverage of a natural disaster”, *Journal of Radio & Audio Media*, vol. 6, n° 1, 1999, pp. 8-26.
- KATES, Robert W., *et al.*, “Reconstruction of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: A research perspective”, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS*, vol. 103, n° 40, 2006, pp. 14.653-14.660.
- LAGOS, Marcelo, “Viviendo con terremotos y tsunamis”, document presented at *Seminario Chile: de la experiencia de terremotos y tsunamis a la cultura sísmica*, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 22-03-2011.
- LITTLEFIELD, Robert S. and QUENETTE, Andrea M., “Crisis leadership and Hurricane Katrina: The portrayal of authority by the media in natural disasters”, *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, vol. 35, n° 1, 2007, pp. 26-47.
- LOWREY, Wilson, *et al.*, “Effective media communication of disasters: Pressing problems and recommendations”, *BMC Public Health*, 7, 2007, p. 97, available on: <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/97>
- LOZANO ASCENCIO, Carlos, “Medios de comunicación y catástrofes: ¿tratantes de información?”, document presented at *XIX Congreso Internacional de Comunicación: La comunicación en situaciones de crisis: del 11M al 14M*, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 2004, pp. 563-574.
- MALHOTRA, Neil and KUO, Alexander, “How Perceptions of Government Failure Shape Attitudes on Federalism and Party Trust: The Case of Hurricane Katrina and Natural Disaster Management”, document presented at the annual meeting of the *Southern Political Science Association*, New Orleans, 07-05-2013.
- MIALL, Leonard, *Inside the BBC: British Broadcasting Characters*, Weindelfed and Nicolson, London, 1994.
- MORGAN, Oliver W., *et al.*, “Mass Fatality Management following the South Asian Tsunami Disaster: Case Studies in Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka”, *PLoS Med*, vol. 3, n° 6, 2006, available on: <http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030195>
- MORALES-MARENTE, Elena and MOYA, Miguel, “Reacciones psico-políticas ante los ataques terroristas del 11 de Marzo de 2004”, *Revista de Psicología Social*, vol. 20, n° 3, 2005, pp. 331-350.
- NEWCOMB, Horace, *Television. The Critical View*. Oxford University Press, New York, 2000.
- NOGUERA VIVO, José Manuel, “El framing en la cobertura periodística de la catástrofe: las víctimas, los culpables y el dolor”, *Sphera pública*, vol. 006, 2006, pp. 193-206.
- NOGUERA VIVO, José Manuel, *Informar emociones: el lenguaje periodístico en la cobertura de catástrofes*, LibrosEnRed, Edición digital, 2005.
- OST, James, *et al.*, “Familiarity breeds distortion: The effects of media exposure on false reports concerning media coverage of the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005”, *Memory*, vol. 16, n° 1, 2008, pp. 76-85.
- OYANEDEL, Regina and ALARCÓN, Claudia, “Una Mirada al tratamiento televisivo de la catástrofe”, *Cuadernos de Información*, n° 26, 2010, pp. 115-122.
- PELLEGRINI, Silvia, *et al.*, *Valor Agregado Periodístico: la apuesta por la calidad de las noticias*, Ediciones UC, Santiago, 2011.
- POTTER, Deborah and RICCHIARDI, Sherry, *Cobertura de desastres y crisis*, International Center for Journalists, Washington, 2006.

- RAMONET, Ignacio, “Aprender de Haití”, *Le Monde Diplomatic en español*, n° 172, 07-02-2010.
- SOUZA, María Dolores and MARTÍNEZ, Victor, “La intervención de la televisión en el terremoto chileno”, *Comunicar*, n° 36, vol. XVIII, 2011, pp. 69-76.
- YEZ, Lyuba, “Desafíos éticos de la cobertura televisiva de un hecho traumático”, *Cuadernos.Info*, n° 32, junio 2013, pp. 39-46.
- ZAWAHRI, Neda, “Natural Disaster and National Security - Hurricane Katrina and the Collapse of Governance in New Orleans”, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, 28-02-2007.
- ZELIZER, Barbie and ALLAN, Stuart, *Journalism after September 11*, Routledge, New York, 2004.