Petar Popović e-mail(Inicie sesión)

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Petar Popović e-mail(Inicie sesión)

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73

El artículo revisa, en la primera sección, los argumentos centrales del relato de John Finnis sobre la «bondad» de la ley. Una vez establecido que las premisas de estos argumentos están situadas en las tesis de Finnis sobre lo que constituyen buenas razones jurídicas para la acción, y sobre la «doble vida» de la ley, se exploran en detalle los tres niveles de bondad de la ley. En la segunda sección, el autor argumenta que la filosofía jurídica de Tomás de Aquino contiene otro nivel discreto de bondad jurídica relevante para la ley. Este nivel se presenta junto con una evaluación crítica de su armonía con la teoría de Finnis.

Palabras clave

John Finnis, razones para la acción, bondad de la ley, bienes humanos básicos, razonabilidad práctica, justicia

Referencias

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