European architectural historiography has traditionally tended to focus on the small percentage of the built environment that can more or less be directly associated with the figure of the architect. Only in recent times has the rest of our built world started to be recognized as a significant component of design and construction practices. Even then, this history often fails to move away from the narrative of architectural authorship, and of projects and clients as key elements of our building culture.
One case in point is real estate development, a centuries-old paradigm that has spurred the urban growth of countless capitals across Europe. Patrice Derrington has recently argued that “the practice of property development [was] formulated as a structured business model in seventeenth-century greater London,” primarily as a response to an unprecedented demand for housing following the Great Fire of 1666. Derrington illustrates this process by focusing on an earlier case, the expensive urban project of Covent Garden, modeled by architect Inigo Jones after continental examples during the 1620s and 1630s. This was the result of a financial investment on the part of the wealthy fourth Earl of Bedford, who developed the area around a lofty piazza by means of what we may associate with early forms of real estate investment.

This exemplification does a great deal in helping to trace the origins of mass investment projects in the building trade – to the benefit of architectural culture as a whole. However, the image of an aristocratic landowner hiring the most famous architect in the country to develop what would become the most expensive neighborhood in the city offers a misleading generalization. As Elisabeth McKellar, Philip Booth, William Baer, and others have amply demonstrated, this image (already debated to some extent by John Summerson) does not take into account a much larger class of actors who emerged during the seventeenth century and came to dominate London’s building industry with their diverse backgrounds, interests, and operative instruments. They were so successful that, 350 years later, we still operate to a large extent within the parameters they established.

The growth of real estate culture in seventeenth-century London thus constitutes one of the most profound transformations in the history of European building culture, with visible cross-continental repercussions and vast consequences for architectural practice that can still be observed today. For example, it was in London that around 1650 the term “real estate” became common with reference to the ownership and capitalization of land property. It can thus be said that much of what we now associate with a European capitalist culture of building speculation began to be formalized in London during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. As McKellar points out, it was at this time that building, traditionally a locally managed craft, started to rapidly turn into a “national industry.”

This was, however, not a stable process and was instead deeply connected to a constellation of social, political, and economic pressures. Over the course of the seventeenth century, an intensifying flow of migrants produced intensive urban growth, resulting in a manifold expansion of London and in the generation of significant social and economic inequalities. At the same time, a general increase in commercial opportunities and capital flow coincided with a tendency toward political and trade deregulation, thus generating financial opportunism for whoever wanted to invest in a booming building industry. Importantly, wages for craftsmen and laborers doubled throughout the seventeenth century, signaling a generalized wealth in the construction sector. The numerous initiatives of individual developers started clashing with intensive action by the state, which was often unable to contain new building. The activities of “foreign” builders aggressively threatened the eroding corporate control of guilds, to the benefit of independent professionals. Craftsmanship itself was also evolving, thus generating competition and disputes between specialists. Furthermore, the interests of landlords and
tenants became a notable occasion for struggle, in a city where, by the 1690s, three-quarters of households were rented. Finally, the political jurisdictions of the Crown and the City were themselves being called into question, especially with respect to matters of urban control.

In short, the housing world of seventeenth-century London was dominated by conflict. Whereas the vast urban expansion of the capital occurred after the Restoration of the Monarchy in 1660 and was catalyzed by the Great Fire of 1666, it was as a result of these more profound tensions in its socio-economic paradigms, which had already begun to arise earlier in the century, that this construction campaign was possible. In such a landscape, the authorial figure of the architect barely found a relevant place. In fact, identifying the architects active in seventeenth-century London is itself problematic. Figures like Inigo Jones or Christopher Wren, who came to embody the authority of a designer and a producer of ideas along canonical Renaissance models, were rare and exceptional. Even the term “architect” was not in common use.

The picture of aristocratic landlords developing their estates through the skilled and expensive service of architects is therefore merely a partial one. In order to understand how real estate culture was generated in seventeenth-century London, we need to reconsider the many other actors who were involved in making the city, as well as the hostile context that produced their novel understanding of building management.

Urban development in early modern London was a fragmented practice, open to all and with no compulsory public recording of financial transactions. The well-known pattern of coordinated property development that we are familiar with today was far from solidified. These processes were dominated by an array of stakeholders who generally do not fit the profile of either the well-to-do landowner or the architect. Instead, London building speculators often came from the middle class and generally from the world of finance or trade, and typically had little experience in building management.

Philip Booth has identified five large and fluid classes of developers who came to dominate London’s building industry during the seventeenth century, and after 1660 in particular: aristocrats, institutions, speculators, financiers, and builders. This categorization already suggests how permeable the London real estate world was. Not only the more traditional aristocracy, but in particular professionals and even building craftsmen could turn a profit by investing in building. With various degrees of influence, these were the protagonists of the London building culture, who operated based on various forms of both partnership and competition.

In the absence of regulated models of property investment, London developers operated on the building market in a fluid and diversified way. Nicholas Barbon (ca. 1640–ca. 1698) is perhaps the most well known example of a seventeenth-century speculator. Though trained as a medical doctor in the Netherlands in the early 1660s, Barbon soon turned his attention to property development, and became something of a mythical figure in the process of rebuilding that followed the Great Fire. Ruthless and aggressive in his ways, he became known for taking advantage of the loose legislative system for the purpose of profit.
He developed an innovative method for dividing large plots of land into smaller parcels and letting them out through building leases, as well as other lucrative initiatives such as Fire Insurance and Land Banking. Barbon was responsible for dozens of London developments from the 1660s onward, many of which were realized through questionable financial operations (fig. 01). For example, in the 1670s, he purchased Essex House, a large sixteenth-century mansion located between the Strand and the River Thames. Barbon demolished the entire property, at the time a lavish late-medieval building facing the street with a vast garden toward the river, and converted it into dense blocks of small housing and commercial units. These were laid out along a main axis, now Essex Street, so as to maximize frontage (fig. 02). Similarly, in the 1680s, Barbon purchased and developed a substantial expanse of unused lands and marshes on the outskirts of London’s northern suburbs, known as Red Lyon Fields, just north of Holborn, along with the adjacent gardens of Grey’s Inn. As in the case of Essex House, Barbon came up with a dense development project, with buildings arranged around a rectilinear street and an elongated square, now known as Red Lion Square (fig. 03).

What these projects already showed besides an interest in maximizing land use and built surface was a plain indifference toward, or even disregard for matters relating to composition. Barbon was not really interested in design, and his energies were entirely devoted to rapid and profitable investments, often to the detriment of quality and collaboration. Barbon was so confident in the success of his investments that he had a printed template prepared for his building agreements, with blank spaces to be filled in simply with the name of the builder and the location of the development. From this perspective, he was almost an “anti-architect,” and designers like Roger North famously despised and even feared him, calling him “an exquisite mob master.”

Unlike Barbon, whose audacity and scale of action actually constitutes something of an exception, many London developers conducted more modest building operations on small plots of land, although still adopting Barbon’s general attitude toward monetary expediency. More affordable scales of investment allowed other actors, such as carpenters and bricklayers, to become property developers as well. For example, Thomas Fitch, originally trained as a craftsman, became a prominent builder during the 1670s by landing an expensive contract to deepen and construct wharfs on the Fleet Ditch, a multiyear project involving hundreds of men. Another important figure was Edward Jerman, originally a carpenter, who rose to prominence as a surveyor and ended up having a successful career as a designer. Others, like Richard Frith, George Pawley, and John Foltrop, all became involved in building projects as master builders and developers in their own right.

Given the professional fluidity in London’s building world, quarrels and confrontations were the norm, especially since existing legislation on matters of property leases and ownership was largely unsuitable for regulating it. In 1666, a Fire Court was established to manage disputes regarding rents and leases and, in general, to address the dramatic lack of specific norms for regulating London’s building landscape. In many cases, the aggressive conflicts could only be resolved by means of equally aggressive measures. Barbon’s development for Essex Street was opposed by the City of London, which formally presented a petition against it. Similarly, the Red Lion Square project became notable for
the viciousness with which contracting and construction were carried out, with riots between owners and laborers, leading to the matter being raised before the Chief Justice. Brett-James noted how, “it was easier in those days to threaten a speculative builder than to bring him to book.” Indeed, financial gain was always the priority of this sort of speculative investments, to the detriment of quality in construction. It is a well-known fact that one of the most common materials to be found in the building industry of London was waste and/or rubbish, which were mixed with clay to save money in the making of bricks. As mentioned before, this tendency also became visible in the configuration of building units. For instance, in the 1690s, the projector and politician Thomas Neale, in his attempt to maximize the capital revenue from the expensive building lease on the area of Seven Dials, came up with a “cross” layout, which, departing from the more prototypical square, made better use of street frontage, despite generating the ineffective triangular-shaped lots that are still visible today (fig. 04).

As noted by McKellar, the significant absence of developers from the traditional narratives of architectural history has largely to do with their roles as building managers rather than designers. In other words, the relevance of building processes for architectural history is traditionally measured as a function of design practices. The case of seventeenth-century London, however, calls into questions whether making buildings requires design at all. As mentioned before, the actors involved in the production of London’s speculative housing generally operated without any particular
interest or expertise in design. In fact, the process of planning through drawing, with which the canonical practice of the architect is identified, was not at all common in early modern London.\(^3^0\) Instead, the architectural drawing was often merely a starting point and remained a flexible and sometimes non-essential component of construction practices throughout the eighteenth century. In some cases, drawings were paid for separately from the rest of the services required of the architect.\(^3^1\) Even on a massive construction site like St. Paul’s Cathedral, Wren’s designs were intended to be fluid, and were subject to change as construction progressed.\(^3^2\)

For the late seventeenth-century London developer, lay-outs were often negotiated on site between contractors and developers by referring to already existing models, which were then copied, adapted, and improved on a case-by-case basis. The typical Georgian London housing unit, a typology still in use today, was the result of an ongoing process of incremental optimization that had already started around 1650. In establishing this common typology, political and social motivations were intertwined with economic, jurisdictional, and managerial interests, such as the availability of materials, the maximization of profit over land use and labor, and compliance with existing building regulations.\(^3^3\) This held true especially after the Great Fire, when the Rebuilding Act of 1667 imposed more consistent building standards.

The key variable and main area for change in the building process was the plan.\(^3^4\) The development of the distributive systems of seventeenth-century London housing was a highly experimental phenomenon, in which particularly the positions of staircase and chimney and the shape and sequence of rooms were adapted to respond to the economy of work and materials and the scale of developments. The prototypical housing unit of late seventeenth-century London, famously identified by Summerson in 1945, has to be understood instead as part of a fluid transition in the establishment of the more well known Georgian townhouse (fig. 05).\(^3^5\)

This iterative process, which took place far away from the drawing board, was largely based on unrecorded exchanges between developers, contractors, and laborers. The formalized methodology of drawing and writing as key communication systems in architectural practice was mostly absent. Instead, the making of the London house plan was territory for an ongoing confrontation between stakeholders whose domains of action and control had for the most part still not been formalized. Trust, confidence, and a competitive attitude were often the sole means to protect one’s own interests. It is in this context that instruments that could assist the prospective London developer in dealing with the novel circumstances of the real estate business were developed.

**MEDIATING CONFLICTS: THE LITERARY WORLD OF LONDON’S SPECULATION**

The professional legitimation of architects has always benefited from specific forms of literary production, most notably the treatise, which was usually intended to showcase one’s own intellectual status to the benefit of patronage and consequent employment.\(^3^6\) Along the same lines, it was not uncommon for builders or surveyors to promote both themselves and the market via small but highly opinionated publications. For example, between the 1670s and 1680s, Barbon wrote two pamphlets, intended to both boost the spirits of property developers, as well as defend his own speculative agenda.\(^3^7\)
On September 20, 1666, just two weeks after the Great Fire, Valentin Knight published an audacious proposal for rebuilding London.\(^\text{38}\) The project consisted only of a written list of nine points, printed on a broadsheet, with no accompanying drawing. Knight imagined an extraordinary system of more than 7000 brick-and-stone terraced houses, four floors tall, and 30 by 25 feet in dimension, laid out along an extensive grid of primary and secondary streets. The plan focused solely on the finances connected with the project, which, with an unrealistically cheap £250 per house, was estimated at a total £223,517, 10s (plus builders’ fees). In a sense similar to that of Barbon, Knight’s large-scale proposal may have functioned as a propagandistic approach to generating the image of a successful entrepreneur, while hoping to promote a vast operation of large-scale rebuilding at the same time. Unfortunately, Knight was imprisoned soon thereafter, since the project had been made public without Royal consent.\(^\text{39}\)

In laying out his proposal, Knight may have been aware of a popular type of operative book, which, already from the 1650s onward, emerged as a way to guide developers through the unfamiliar terrain of London’s building world. One of the first books of this kind was Henry Phillips’s *Purchasers Pattern* (1653). The small booklet was composed, as the author himself put it, of “Law, Reason and Arithmetick,” and included tables for calculating interest rates, methods for valuing and measuring land and building materials, and practical procedures for complying with existing norms.\(^\text{40}\)

Phillips’ successful book, which went through six editions in less than twenty years, was intended as a valuable source for building developers to avoid “not only deceiv[ing] others, but in many times their selves [sic].”\(^\text{41}\) In other words, the publication could become an arbiter between the actors involved in building investments. In his publication of 1663, *Counsel and Advice to All Builders*, the diplomat Sir Balthazar Gerbier similarly instructed building proprietors on how to distinguish the most reliable surveyors, clerks, and master workmen, as well as how to value the cost of building materials and components such as cornices, columns, and friezes.\(^\text{42}\)

Phillips and Gerbier’s projected readerships consisted primarily of prospective building investors, who, when learning the complexities of property development, desperately needed assistance in networking and regulating employment rates, price negotiations, and financial transactions. Likewise, in 1668, the surveyor and printer William Leybourn dedicated his *Platform for Purchasers* to “Buyers and Sellers, Landlords and Tenants, Lessors and Lessees, Builders and Workmen in their respective concernments,”\(^\text{43}\) The printer Stephen Primatt called them “City-Builders,” pointing to:

… certain Differences arising amongst them, as to their respective interests on the Ground, and late Houses; others through their unskilfulness in building were no less indisposed to it, for that many of them are compelled to trust the conscience and Fidelity of Workmen and Surveyors, who have been observed to make Harvest in the City Ruines, and combine together to take excessive Rates for their works, which hath dis-encouraged many of the them [sic].\(^\text{44}\)

These books were then primarily intended as mediators, in what was clearly recognized as a dangerous jungle of conflicting interests between “City-Builders” in buying, leasing, and building. In order to illustrate
how the terms of a tenants’ agreement could be peacefully negotiated, Leybourn’s *Platform for Purchasers* was structured based on mock conversations between characters such as “Ditissimus,” “Inquilinus,” and “Rationarius” (representing respectively the rich landlord, the poor tenant, and the reasonable mediator) and “Catechizeta” and “Precator” (the instructor and the requester).

The quintessential instrument for the success of a building investor was measuring. For Primatt, the cornerstone of his *Purchasers Pattern* was the principle of “valuation.” Whether in
the cost of wages or building materials, interest rates or leaseholds, the dimensions of the site or of building components, building was a problem of quantity. Measurements permeated all sectors and phases of building construction, as illustrated in the frontispiece of John Wiblin's popular *The Art of Measuring* (fig. 06). In this sense, these building guides are indebted to a significant tradition of surveying books and manuals, such as Thomas Digges's *A Booke Named Tectonicon* (1562), Maron Rathborne's *The Surveyor in Four Bookes* (1616), or William Oughtred's *Clavis Mathematicae* (1631). From these, Phillips, Primatt, Leybourn, and Wiblin took an important subject matter, which, combined with their own direct experience as printers and surveyors, articulated an operative strategy for canonizing building construction numerically, while becoming powerful editorial sources of economic gain at the same time.

This quantification of building processes also promoted a systematized landscape of professional collaborations and human interactions. The built environment was the financial arena in which to establish canons of operations and communication schema between the various actors involved. According to Phillips,

"Houses are . . . chiefly sleeping holes to defend them [tenants] from the injury of the weather; for which purpose many times less costly houses would serve the turn... it will the part of every wise builder, to lay out no more thereon, than is fitting and necessary, according to the place it stands in."
As this passage suggests, issues of composition were essentially absent from these books. In some cases, authors even included detailed lists of ready-made housing plans, thus providing speculators with an instrument for bypassing design entirely by copying models for their “sleeping holes” (fig. 07). The architectural project was nothing more than a contractual mediation and transaction between parts. Building guides constituted the template for optimizing these transactions, and offered a corresponding solution for each economic necessity.

What these books ultimately testify to is hence the existence of a largely unsystematized and rapidly shifting business world, made up of a vast array of actors, each with their own interests at heart and looking to facilitate real estate operations. The Great Fire of 1666 only precipitated and made unmistakably visible the changes that were already taking place in the building world of London, such as contracting procedures, measuring, wage calculations, management during and after construction, and, in some cases, assembling buildings. In this context, the attributes and practices normally associated with the architect, such as composition, patronage, distribution, authorship, and theory, were either circumvented or entirely absent.

CONCLUSIONS

The building world of seventeenth-century London came to be a vast and open market that operated primarily without the knowledge base normally associated with the European traditions of the architectural profession. A modern urban landscape, which reflects early capitalist models of urban production that remain substantially present in our own current building culture, was instead generated by managing and mediating conflicts between newly self-made speculators. The Georgian terrace house, a prototypical urban form that still constitutes a key typology for English national architecture, originated primarily from these speculative processes. As a result, even the bourgeoisie culture associated with this domestic space was significantly intertwined with financial interests. Architecture was the product of commercial and legal transactions, based primarily on managerial and supervisory processes, and far removed from the architect’s drawing board.

In this context, building guides and management manuals contributed to codifying an archipelago of still informal and occasional business relationships, while enabling the economic development of London’s building world at the same time. These books become substantial sources for investigating the details of such speculative processes, which developed first and foremost through forms of monetary partnership and rivalry among a fluid group of often unprepared, but highly motivated building investors. Everything, from distribution systems to matters of class and social status, became elements of contractual agreements for the purpose of capital revenue to a similar extent. Through their popular publications, Phillips, Gerbier, Knight, Barbon, Primatt, Leybourn, and others delineated portions of a foundational image of London, where the practice of building was reinvented as a financial confrontation – a confrontation that, as it turns out, laid the groundwork for our current speculative urban culture.
Notes


04. In 1647 barrister Robert Carris adopted the term “real estate” to indicate an individual’s immovable property, as opposed to “personal estate.” See “Real Estate” in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED).


22. “Edward Jerman” in ODNB.


42. GERBIER, Balthazar, *Counsel and Advice to All Builders*, London, 1663.


48. PHILLIPS, The Purchasers Pattern, 10–11.


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