Descartes on sensory perception
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This article defends that according to Descartes there are two kinds of sensorial perception. One that operates on impulse, confusing properties of the physical things with our ideas of them; and another one that proceeds by deduction and distinguishes between those properties of physical things that have an adequate representation in our ideas and the properties that do not.
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