Fernando Arancibia-Collao e-mail(Inicie sesión)

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Fernando Arancibia-Collao e-mail(Inicie sesión)

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223

En este artículo se hará una revisión de los aspectos más destacados de las teorías éticas iusnaturalistas recientes en la tradición analítica. Se expondrán los aspectos unitarios de dichas teorías y, posteriormente, se analizarán sus divergencias más esenciales, específicamente, las epistemológicas y ontológicas. Finalmente, se explorarán las posibilidades de desarrollo para las teorías iusnaturalistas y sus implicancias metaéticas, especialmente las relativas a la fundamentación metafísica y epistemológica de la ley natural.

Palabras clave

bienes humanos básicos, inclinacionismo y derivacionismo, intuicionismo, valor intrínseco

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