Adam Smith and relativism
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In this paper I will argue that Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments is not a relativistic ethics. Although many ethical norms are conventional, there are others, particularly those of justice, which are cross-cultural. Smith’s view of justice, summarized in the imperative ‘Do not harm our equals’, contains two elements: on the one hand the term ‘harm’, which might be culture-relative; yet, on the other, the term ‘equals’, whose referent, although not always recognized, does not depend on different ‘cultures’ notions.
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